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How well Thailand's financial sector  can provide the investible
funds demanded by the country's current boom depends partly
on its ability to mobilize savings - through official policy on
credit allocation and through the movement of capital interna-
tionally.
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Macroeconomic  Adjustment  and Growth
WPS  440
This  paper  - a product  of  tile  Macroeconomic  Adjustment  and  Growth  and  Financial  Policy  Divisions,
Country  Economics  Department  - is pait  of a larger  effort  in PRE  to analyze  links  between  macroccon-
omic  policy  and  f'inancial  sector  performance.  This  work  is  related  to  a  research  project  on  the
macroeconomic  consequences  of  public  sector  deficits.  Copies  of this  paper  are  available  free  from  the
World  Bank,  1818  H- Strect  NW,  Washington  DC  20433.  Please  contact  Raquel  Luz,  room  NI  1-057,
extension  34303  (68  pages  with  ligures  and  tables).
T'hailand's  recent  boom  has  been  atccomplished  commodity  exports  - but  thesc  are either
in an  economy  open  to external  forces.  Despite  relatively  small  in scope  or  tend  to  be  only  partly
the  fiscal  correction  achieved  in  1986-89,  enforced,  so they  distort  the  allocation  of  credit
expansion  of' domestic  demand  made  itself'  f'elt in  only  slightly.  A  number  of quasi-fiscal  require-
a wvidening  of  the current  account  def-icit.  This  ments  add  about  1.5  percentage  points  to gross
def'icit  partly  reflects  the  need  for  a surge  of'  banking  spreads.
capital  spending  to develop  export  prospecis  anrd
to  prov ide  itie  necessary  iif'raistructure  ----  Tut  'lihe intierest-rate  ceilings  on  bank  loans  have
care  must  be  xtaken  that  invcstment  not  gct  too  far  probably  lowered  the  cost  for  some  nonprime
out  ol' line  with  the  economy's  long-temi  savings  borrowers  but  may  havc  incrcased  rates  for
poten.tial.  others  and  excluded  some  high-risk  borrowers.
I low  well  the  country  's  financial  seceol  can  Capital  movements  are  restricted,  and  tthere
provide  tlhc invcstment  lun(is  thc  bono  demamids  is evidence  that  domestic  monetary  conditionis
dlepel7nds  partly  oni its ability  tO moobilize savings,  have  a shlort-run  eff'ect  on wholesale  interest
on oi'fficial policy  about  credcit allocation,  andi on  rates.  But  wholesale  interest  rates  tend  to
tile (degree  to which capital is lfee tlo  fow  coniverge  to foreign levels in the medium tenn,
inwernationalIl.  suggestiring that  monetary  policy  has  only  a short-
tenm cf'lccl.
Resource  mobilization  in Thailand  is  imnprcs-
sive:  iLs liquidity  ratio  is surpassed  in only  a  Easterly  and  llonohan  make  recommenda-
handful  of'developing  counitries.  tionls for  dveloping  monetary  policy  instruments
and  for  recasting  and  reducinig  quasi-fiscal  and
'I'There are  some  selective  cred'it  measures  credit  allocation  impositiorns  on  the  financiat
mainly  faIvoring  agriculture,  agribusiness,  and  Sz  system.
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We are grateful for the research assistance of Maria Cristina Almero and
Piyabha Kongsamut, for comments from and/or useful discussion  with Bela
Balassa, Zamir Hasan, Amara Sriphayak,  Andrew Steer, James Henson, Danny
Leipziger,  Anoop Singh, Kevin Young, Ismail Della, Chris Barltrop, Jerry
Caprio, Robert Effrcs, Marcelo Giugale, Marilaos Vittas and economists in the
Bank of Thailand, the Thai Government, the Thai Development Research
Institute, and Thammasat University.Thailand  has  become  one  of the  developing  world's  outstanding  success
stories  over  the  past  decade. We look  in this  paper  at  what role  the
management  of financial  sector  policy  has  or  has  not  contributed  to that
success.  We give recommendations  based  on this  analysis  as to  how Lhe  good
economic  performance  can  be preserved.  We look  first  in Part.  I at how  the
financial  sector  fits  into  the  overall  macroeconomic  environment. In Part  II,
we analyze  the  central  :ssue  of interest  rate  determination.  The  recurrent
theme  in  both  parts  is that  the  degree  of integration  of the  Thai  financial
market  with the  rest  of the  world  is  the  key  factor  in  determining  how
financial  sector  policy  affects  economic  performance.
I.  THE  MACROECONOMIC  CONTEXT
In this  part  we look  first  at the  performance  of the  real  economy  in
recent  years. We then  examine  the  question  of the  openness  of the  economy  to
capital  flows. This  allows  us to evaluate  the  relative  effectiveness  of
fiscal  versus  monetary  policies. The  following  section  considers  the
macroeconomic  impact  of the  means  of financing  domestic  investment.  This  is
placed  in context  of the  overall  rapid  growth  of the  financial  system  in  the
following  section. The  policies  of  Bank  of Thailand  to influence  credit
allocation  are  then  examined. Part  I  concludes  with  an examination  of the
overall  impact  of  macro  policies  on  the  Thai  economy  given  the  financial
sector  characteristics  set  out  previously.
A.  Overview  of the  real  economy
Thailand  has  had  one  of the  most  rapidly  growing  economies  in  the
world  for  the  last  three  years. After  growth  of 8.4  percent  in 1987  and  11
percent  in 1988  (Table  1),  growth  of  around  10-11  percent  is  expected  for- 2 -
1989.  The  financial  sector  has  been in  the  forefronL  of this  growth,  as  value
added  in financial  services  shot  up by 33.6  percent  in 1987  and  16.3  percent
in 1988. This  is partly  due  to the  -tpid  growth  of sectors  such  as
construction --  13.7 percent growth in 1988 --  and real  estate transactions --
26.8  percent  growth  in 1988.
This  reflects  the  massive  real  estate  boom that  the  economy  has
experienced,  especially  in  construction  of office  and  residential
condominiums.  Although  no hard  figures  are  available,  informal  reports  speak
of a doubling  of real  estate  values  in  prime  areas  over  the  past  year.  The
surging  Thai  stock  market  also  indicates  that  the  valuation  of  physical
capital  has  risen  sharply.  The  Securities  Exchange  of Thailand  (SFT)  index
rose  by 84 percent  in  the  first  nine  months  of 1989,  after  increasing  by 36
percent  in 1988.  The implied  capital  gain  on the  stock  market  alone  for  the
first  nine  months  of 1989  amounts  to  about  15  percent  of GDP. Such  a
significant  gain seems  likely  to be  contributing  to the  boom  in  private
investment,  increasing  both  the  expected  rate  of return  to investment  and
liquidity  of corporations  and  private  households.
The  private  investment  boom  has  been  leading  GDP  growth  on the  demand
side. Private  investment  growth  of 18  percent  is expected  in  1989,  after  last
year's  surge  of 23.4  percent. Private  consumption  has  been  lagging  behind
overall  growth  of the  economy,  while  both  government  investment  and
consumption  have  been  growing  more slowly  or even  falling,  as explained  in
more  detail  below.
The  expansion  has taken  place  with little  acceleration  of inflation.
Even  recent  signs  of acceleration  seem  to  be reflecting  mainly  a relative
price  shift.  The  average  inflation  for  1989  is  expected  to  be 5.6  percent,  up
from  3.8  percent  in 1988 (Table  2).  Items  that  are  rapidly  growing  in  price- 3 -
are  either  those  whose  international  price  has  risen  rapidly  --  rice  and  other
food commodities --  or those that are nontraded and in booming sectors --
construction  materials. As standard  analysis  would  predict,  the  demand
expansion  is putting  some  upward  pressure  on the  ratio  of nontraded  to traded
goods  prices.
The  main force  of the  derand  expansion  has  been felt  in the  widening
external  deficit,  as shown  in  Table  3.  Although  private  saving  has risen,  it
has lagged  behind  the  extraordinary  rise  of private  investment,  so  that  a
current  account  deficit  (investment-saving)  of 3 percent  of GDP  appeared  in
1988,  with a like  figure  expected  for  1989. The  public  resource  balance  has
played  the  desired  countercyclical  role,  with  a resource  surplus achieved  in
1988  for  the first  time  since  1974.
Although  external  deficits  were significant  J  1988-89,  this  was
following  a successful  external  adjustment  where  pre  iously  much  higher
external  deficits  were  eliminated.  A rough  calculation  suggests  that  a
current  account  deficit  of no  more  than  2.3Z  of GDP  would  be required  in  1990
to  keep the  ratio  of  net  external  liabilities  to  GDP  stable,  assuming  that
growth  remains  at 1OZ  in 1990. In  the  medium  term,  a current  account  deficit
of 1.6Z  of  GDP  would  be required  to keep  the  debt  ratio  stable  at the  long-run
growth  rate  of 7Z. As Table  3 shows,  the  reduction  in  the  public  resource
deficit  has  been  the  most  important  force  to restore  external  balance  to the
economy. The  public  surplus  currently  in  place  is desirable  to restrain
private  demand  and  keep the  current  account  deficit  within  bounds.
Table  4 shows  the  components  underlying  the  behavior  of public
deficits. After  several  years  of  high  deficits  in  1981-85,  a  major  fiscal
&djustment  was  achieved  in  1986-89. This  was achieved  both  through  decreases
in current  and  capital  expenditure,  and  through  a large  increase  in revenue.- 4  -
The relative  decline  of  public .nvektment  was  partly  unintentional,  reflecting
project  delays  at shortages  of construction  materials  and  rapidly  rising
materials  prices  wreaked  havoc  on  budget  execut'  n procedures.  This  problem
is  now  being  addressed  by introducing  an adjustment  for  construction  costs
into  pro,ect  execution  procedure.
The  revenue  increase  was  also  partially  endogenous  to the  expansion,
reflecting  the  rapid  rise  in  the  taxes  most  sensitive  to economic  activity-
-tariffs  on imports  (24  percent  increase  in  FY88/89),  corpJrate  income  tax
receipts  (32  percent  increase),  and  business  tax  receipts  (35  percen;
increase). This  suggests  that  the  achievement  of the  fiscal  surplus  not
merely  be seen  as the  completion  of the  adjustment  undertaken  since  the  earl-'
1980's,  but  also  as reflecting  beneficial  feedback  from  the  economic  expansion
itself.
Although  the  fiscal  adjustment  has  been  very  impressive,  it  has  not
been  sufficient  to  keep  up  with  the  rapid  rise  in  private  investment,  so that
the  external  resource  gap  has  been  large  in  1988-89. This  leads  us to  the
issue  of the  adequacy  of domestic  financing  for  investment  over  the  long  term.
B.  Ovenness  of the  financial  system
,n  analyzing  the  financing  of  public  and  private  investment  by the
financial  system,  it is important  to analyze  the  degree  of openness  of  the
Thai  economy  to external  capital  flows. Theory  predicts  that  an economy
perfectly  open  to capital  flows  will display  several  important
characteristics.  The  domestic  interest  rate  will  not  be affected  by private
sector  excess  demand  or fiscal  deficits  but  will  be determined  solely  by
international  interest  rates  (plus  expected  devaluation  of the  domestic
currency). Changes  in  the  fiscal  deficit  or autonomous  private  demand  willpass  through  into  .ae  cu-rent  account  defickt  of the  balance  of  payments
rather  than  increasing  domestic  interest  rates.
Public  borrowing  in the  domestic  financPl market  will  not  crowd  out
private  investment;  instead,  there  will  be offsetting  private  borrowing  in
external  markets. Similarly,  credit  expansion  by the  central  bank  will  be
entirely  offset  by a  loss  of foreign  exchange  reserves,  other  things  equal.
Credit  expansion  by the  entire  financial  system  will  be offset  by a decline  in
net foreign  assets  to the  extent  that  it  exceeds  the  expansion  in  money
demand. In such  an  economy,  the  level  and  composition  of the  financing  of the
public  deficit  has  no effect  on  private  investment. 1
With  perfect  capital  mobility,  fiscai  policy  is  effective  in
restraining  aggregate  demand  to improve  the  current  account. 2 Monetary  policy
is ineffective  either  to  affect  the  current  account  deficit  or private
investment,  but  does  have  a strong  effect  on the  level  of foreign  exchange
reserves.
The  capital  market  in Thailand  is  not  formally  open.  Residents  are
not permitted  to buy  foreign  exch%nge  except  for  documented  purposes  s  -h as
imports,  travel,  etc. Foreign  currency  accounts  are  not  permitted  in the
banking  system  except  for  narrowly  circumscribed  purposes.  Commercial  banks
l.One  caveat  to  this  result  must  be mentioned. If the  private  sector
anticipates  that  excessive  public  sector  deficits  will lead  to a balance  of
payments  crisis,  devaluation,  and/or  the  rationing  of  external  credits
sometime  in the  future,  then  deficits  will  affect  expectations  and  thus
private  investment.
2.There  is the  theoretical  possibility  that  private  saving  could  offset
changes  in fiscal  policy  ("Ricardian  equivalence"),  but  mest  empirical  tests
have shown  that  this  does  not  hold  in  either  industrial  or developing
countries.- 6 -
can  move  capital  both in  and  out  but  cannot  have  a net  foreign  exchanre
position  greater  than  2n percent  of their  capital  (or  B5 billion,  whichever  is
smaller). While  banks  can  use  the  forward  market  to cover  their  positions,
the  market  is  limited  to  commercial  banks,  importsrs,  and  exporters,  and  only
for  short-term  cperations.
While  this  degree  of capital  contro'ls  makes  it  unlikely  that  the  Thai
capital  market  is  perfectly  open, the  economy  exhibits  many  of the
characteristics  of i  high  degree  of openness. 3 Figure  1 shows  the  behavior
of the  public  and  current  account  deficits. There  is  a statistically
significant  correlation,  indicating  a  high  degree  of  pass-through  of fiscal
into  external  deficits. A simple  regression  of the  current  account  deficit  on
the  fiscal  deficit  shows  an  R2 of .21  and  a coefficient  of .50  on the  fiscal
deficit  (significant  at the  52 level). While  more  analysis  is  needed  to
resolve  potential  problems  of simultaneity  and  omitted  variables,  this  result
may  be interpreted  as suggestive  of the  high  degree  of openness  of the
economy. 4
While  these  results  suggest  that  the  current  account  deficit  is
affected  strongly  by fiscal  deficits,  this  does  not  mean that  a fiscal  deficit
is  the  only  possible  cause  of external  deficits. Excess  private  demand  can
also lead  to  current  account  deficits,  as is the  case  for  1988-89.
Figure  2 shows  the  behavior  of Bank  of  Thailand  domestic  credit  and
net foreign  assets  over  1971-E9. Again  a  negative  correlation  is  displayed.
which  is suggestive  of a  high  degree  of offset  of reserve  changes  to  domestic
3.The  Thai  economy  is also  relatively  open  to  trade  flows,  as shown  by the
large  increase  in  the  share  of  exports  and  imports  in  GDP  over  the  last  2
decades. An analysis  of trade  policy  across  countries  in  the  1987  WDR
classified  Thailand  as woutward-oriented."
4.The  regression  results  are  in the  appendix.-7-
credit  expansion. This  would  suggest  that  monetary  policy  is relatively
ineffective  in  managing  domestic  demand  over  the  medium  run.  Intuitively,
attempts  by Bank  of Thailand  to  tighten  monetary  policy  lead  to  an incipient
increase  in interest ates. This  triggers  a capital  inflow  --  and
accumulation  of reserves  at  BOT  --  until  the  monetary  tightness  is  mostly
undone  and  interest  rates  are  roughly  at  par  with foreign  ones. 5 L&ke
convergence  of domestic  and  foreign  interest  rates  is  taken  up below.
C.  Financing  of domestic  investment
With  a  high  degree  of  openness,  the  relevant  concept  for  analyzing
the  role  of external  financing  is  the  ratio  of total  external  borrowing  to
total  investment.  Table  5  shows  that  the  ratio  was fairly  modest  --  less  than
10 percent  --  over  the  1970's,  which  helps  to  explain  how  Thailand  avoided  the
debt  crisis  by  which  many  other  middle-income  countries  were beset. Over
1979-85  the  ratio  increased  significantly,  but  then  decreased  again  in 1986-88
as the  fiscal  adjustment  improved  the  external  situation.  We also  see  a large
increase  in the  role  of  direct  foreign  investment  in total  external  financing
in  1988,  a tendency  which  continued  strongly  in  1989.  The  external  debt  ratio
peaked  in 1985  at 34.2  percent  of  GDP,  then  declined  to 26.5  percent  by 1988.
A  long-run  tendency  toward  excessive  dependence  of investment  on external
financing  is  not  apparent  in  these  numbers.
5.A  simple  regression  of reserve  changes  on  BOT  domestic  credit  expansion
shows  an  R2 of .92  and  a  coefficient  of -1.039,  with  a  t-statistic  of 14.1,
as shown  in the  Appendix. Again,  there  are  potential  problems  of
simultaneity  that  could  arise  out  of policy  reactions  to reserve  changes.
For  example,  the  Bank  of  Thailand  could  be reacting  to  any  change  by  a
tightening  or loosening  of  credit. This  possibility  should  be exarined
further  in future  research.Table  5 also shows  the  financing  breakdown  of  public  and  private
investment.  As argued  earlier,  this  does  not  have  much  macroeconomic
significance  in  a  highly  open  economy,  but  it is still  of interest  on
institutional  grounds. Public  investment  consistently  has  a  higher  ratio  of
external  financing  than  private  investment,  going  as  high  as  87 percent  in
1985.  The  role  of external  financing  in  private  investment  never  exceeds  20
percent.
The  achievement  of a surplus  by the  government  allowed  a reduction  in
its  external  financing  needs. Since  there  continued  to  be a small  positive
amount  of  borrowing,  however,  the  surplus  led  to a shaxp  reduction  in  domestic
government  debt.  The  domestic  debt  reduced  most  sharply  was that  owed  to the
banking  system,  as  was shown  in Table  4.
The  sharp  reduction  in  public  borrowing  from  the  banking  system
allowed  a rapid  expansion  of private  credit,  even  thougi  total  domestic  credit
stayed  roughly  constant  as a ratio  to GDP (Table  6).  The  ratio  of public
dome,tic  credit  to GDP  peaked  at 17 percent  in  1984,  then  declined  to 9.5
per:ent  in 1988. Private  credit  reached  57.3  percent  of  GDP in  1988  from  48
percent  in 1984. Over  60 percent  of private  investment  was financed  by
domestic  credit  during  1987-88. Since  total  credit  stayed  roughly  constant
while  there  was an increase  in demand  for  financial  assets,  as reflected  in  a
high  ratio  of  M2 to  GDP,  thare  was an increase  in  net  foreign  assets  of the
financial  system.
D.  Development  and  growth  of the  financial  system
Thailand  has  an  exceptionally  deep  financial  system. As Table  6
shows,  the  ratio  of broad  money  to  GDP  in 1989  was 65.4  percent,  a figure- 9 -
exceeded  only  by a  handful  of developing  countries. 6 Figurs  4 shows  that  much
of this  monetization  has taken  place  relatively  recently. As recently  as
1981,  the  ratio  of  money  to  GDP  was  only  38.5  percent. The  rapid  monetization
took  place  because  an increasingly  large  shake  of private  saving  (net  of
depreciation)  was channeled  into  accumulation  of financial  assets. Table  6
shows  how  in 1984-88  80 percent  of saving  was in  the  form  of broad  money.
This  contrasts  to an  average  of 40 percent  in the  1970's  and  60  percent  in
1980-83. This  increased financializationm  of saving  seems  to  be taking  place
both  in response  to  high  real  interest  rates  (see  table  7) and  increased
confidence  in  the  economy  as a result  of the  successful  macroeconomic
adjustment.  The  rapid  mouetizatinn  itself  must  have  contributed  to  the
adjustment  (as  well as  preventing  a  more serious  crisis  earlier  in the  80's)
by lessening  the  adverse  impact  of  any  given  fiscal  deficit  o- .. nternational
reserves. The  high  monetization  ratio  in  1987-89  also  suggests  that  the
financial sector is keepir.g  up  with the booming economy.
The  monet"  ation  of the  economy  has led  to a complementarf  rise  in
credit. As Table  8 shows,  this  increase  in financial  intermediat:on  has  been
well  distributed  across  sectors. All  of the  sectors  identified  except  for
utilities  show  an  appreciable  increase  in  the  ratio  of total  credit
outstanding  to  value  added  over  1981-88. However,  this  also  implies  that  the
unequal  distribution  of credit  across  sectors  persisted  in the  1980's. In
6.The  1989  World  Development  Report  lists  only  8 low  and  middle  income
countries  (out  of 73)  with a  higher  ratio  of broad  money  to GDP  in
1987--China,  Yemen  PDR,  Yemen  Arab  Republic,  Egypt,  Jordan,  Malaysia,
Portugal,  and  Greece. Even  some  of these  countries  have  price  controls  with
goods  rationing,  which  artificially  inflates  the  money  to GDP  ratio  (the
'money  overhang').  Thailand's  monetizatien  ratio  even  compares  favorably
with that  of high  income  countries  --  their  median  ratio  of broad  money  to
GDP  in 1987  was 64.8  percent.- 10  -
particular,  the  agricultural  sector  received  far  less  credit  relative  to  value
added  than  the  other  sectors. This  in  part  must  reflect  structural  or
technical  characteristics  of the  sec  r  --  a relatively  lower  level  of fixed
assets  that  neecd  to be financed,  for  example.
Concern  also  has  been  expressed  about  possible  excessive  lending  to
real  estate  and  construction,  particularly  in light  of the  recent  land  boom.
We cannot  evaluate  this  based  on the  aggregate  lending  figures  alone  --  it
would  also  require  detailed  knowledge  of the  adequacy  of banks'  credit
supervision  and  monitoring  procedures.  However,  the  aggregate  figures  by
themselves  do not show  much  cause  for  concern. The  ratio  of credit  to  value
added  in 1988  was only  moderately  higher  than  in  1984  after  an intervening
drop.
As in every  country,  the  financial  - :tor  in Thailand  is affected
considerably  by the  cyclical  fluctuations  in  the  economy. Almost  a quarter  of
commercial  bank  loans  go to real  estate,  construction,  or financial  services
companies. As figure  5 shows,  real  output  in these  sectors  is  considerably
more  volatile  than  overall  output  (as  in  most  countries).  The  financial
sector  is  thus  inherently  more  vulnerable  to  domestic  output  fluctuations  than
many  other  sectors. The  typical  pattern  of financial  crises  is that  portfolio
quality  declines  during  rapid  expansions  of  credit  during  booms. The  poor
quality  of some  loans  is  exposed  by the  subsequent  bust,  lLading  to financial
distress  in the  weakest  banks  and  finance  companies. This  pattern  only
partially  holds  true  in  Thailand. The  first  crisis  in the  Thai  financial
sector,  in 1979,  was indeed  associated  with  a sharp  downturn  i.i  output. 7
7.The  history  of crises  in  the  Thai  financial  sector  in  the  last  decade  is
admirably  described  in  T. Sundaravej  and  P. Trairatvorakul,  Experiences  of
Financial  Distress  in  Thailand,  background  paper  for  the  1989  World
Development  Report,  PPR  WPS 283,  World  Bank,  December  1989.- 11  -
However,  the  second  and  more serious  financial  crisis  (in  1983-84)  came  during
a period  of expansion,  although  the  subsequent  downturn  in  1985-86  complicated
the  treatment  of the  crisis. This  suggests  that  financial  distress  is  not
mechanically  linked  to cyclical  fluctuations,  although  prudence  concerning
portfolio  quality  during  times  of rapid  economic  expansion  would  be  well
justified.
E.  Bank  of Thailand  credit  allocation  policies
The  concern  that  the  agricultural  sector  may  be discriminated  against
by the  financial  system  led  the  Bank  of  Thailand  to initiate  policies  to
direct  credit  towards  this  sector. Bank  of  Thailand  currently  requires
commercial  banks  to lend  20 percent  of their  deposits  to  the  agricultural
sector. Of this  a  maximum  of 6  percent  of  deposits  can  be lent  to
agribusiness  concerns. Any  shortfall  of the  lending  from  the  target  must  be
deposited  by  banks  at the  Bank  for  Agriculture  and  Agricultural  Cooperatives
(BAAC)  at below-market  interest  rates. As shown  in table  9, the  target  for
lending  has  been revised  several  times,  most recently  in  1987.
However,  as Table  9  shows,  the  policies  of Bank  of Thailand  do not
appear  to  have  been strictly  enforced,  although  they  do have  some  effect  on
commercial  bank  behavior. Commercial  banks  have  a significant  shortfall  in
their  lending  to the  agricultural  sector. While  they  do place  some  deposits
at  BAAC --  unwillingly,  since  the  interest  rates  are  below  the  market  rate
-- these  have  not  been  enough  to  cover  the  shortfall  since  1985.  These
deposits  have  even  declined  slightly  as a ratio  to deposits,  although  the
shortfall  has increased.  However,  the  banks  did  appear  to increase  their
lending  to  agriculture  after  the  target  was raised,  even  if insufficiently.- 12 -
Banks  have  exceeded  the  target  for  agribusiness  lending  every  year,
but this  does  not  compensate  for  the shortfall  on lending  to agricultural
producers  under  BOT  regulations.  The  aggregate  target  thus  has  a shortfall
every  year  even  if the  BAAC  deposits  are  counted  as loans  to the  agricultural
sector.
The  agricultural  lending  requirement  does  not  appear  to  have  a strong
economic  justification.  As suggested  earlier,  the  lower  level  of credit
utilization  by the  agricultural  sector  probably  reflects  technical  and
institutional  characteristics  of production  in that  sector,  and  not
necessarily  a  market  failure  on the  part  of lenders. To the  extent  that  it is
enforced,  the  requirement  to lend  to agriculture  may  result  in  credit  being
directed  away  from  uses  where  it  has  the  highest  rate  of return. Thus,  the
lax  enforcement  of this  measure  may  be a blessing  in disguise. However,
having  the  regulation  on the  books  imposes  administrative  costs  and  some
uncertainties  in  portfolio  management,  suggesting  that  it  would  be preferable
to substitute  a formal  easing  of the  requirement  for  the  present  lack  of
enforcement.
However,  in  considering  possible  changes  in this  requirement  other
regulations  that  affect  the  agricultural  sector  should  also  be  evaluated. In
particular,  the  ceiling  on lending  rates  may  itself  be causing  discrimination
against  the  agricultural  sector. Since  agricultural  lending  is typically  more
risky  than  other  types  of credit,  a ceiling  on rates  may lead  banks  to  eschew
these  loans,  even  though  the  average  loan  rate  is  below  the  ceiling. A move
toward  greater  efficiency  of  credit  allocation  across  sectors  would require
liberalization  of both  the  agricultural  lending  requirement  and  the  ceiling  on
loan  rates.- 13 -
The  other  major  effort  of Bank  of Thailand  to  influence  credit
allocation  is  development  lending  for  specific  purposes,  such  as  promotion  of
exports, small-scale  industry,  and  agricultural  production. Bank  of Thailand
will rediscount  bills  for  these  purposes  presented  to it by commercial  banks.
The  rate  of rediscount  is  3 to 5  percent  for  different  purposes. Table  10
shows  the  evolution  of development  lending  since  1982  in  relation  to total
commercial  bank  credit  by sector. We see  that  only  export  credits  are
significant  relative  to  total  sectoral  credit. Total  development  credits  have
not  been  more  than  9  percent  of total  commercial  bank  lending  since  1982.
In 1989  development  credits  have  decreased  sharply,  as shown  in table
10.  This  reflects  the  policy  announced  by Bank  of Thailand  at the  beginning
of the  year  that  it  will  henceforth  only  rediscount  50  percent  of the  face
value  of loans  to  preferential  borrowers,  instead  of 80  percent  as previously.
The impact  of this  measure  was felt  most  strongly  in the  export  sector,  where
the  share  of  development  credits  in the  total  was  reduced  from  49 percent  to
20 percent.
The  reduction  in development  credits  seems  to  be desirable,  since
development  lending  is  not  necessary  for  activities  that  have  a high  enough
rate  of return  to  be economically  viable  and  not  desirable  for  unviable
activities.  Development  loans  have  a fiscal  cost  that  is financed  implicitly
through  taxes  on other  users  of financial  services. Although  these
distortions  do  not  appear  to  have  been  large,  their  reduction  is  a  wise policy
move  during  a time  of good  performance  in  the  sectors  being  favored.
The  Bank  of Thailand  has  a  more informal  policy  instrument  in the
'moral  suasion'  that  it  exercises  to restrain  excessive  credit  increases  to
particular  sectors. This  has  been  used  recently  to try  to  dissuade  banks  from
excessive  lending  for  real  estate  speculation.  It is  difficult  to evaluate- 14 -
the  success  of this  policy  since  we cannot  know  what bank  lending  would  have
been  in  the  absence  of "moral  suasion'. The  rapid  growth  of credits  to real
estate  businesses  (48  percent  in  1988)  could  suggest  the  effectiveness  of the
policy  has  been  limited. However,  as  we saw  earlier,  the  ratio  of credit  to
value  added  in this  sector  is  only  moderately  increased  from  previous  years,
so it is  possible  BOT  played  a role.
There  are  two  other  policy  instruments  that  are  agreed  upon  jointly
by Bank  of Thailand  and  the  Ministry  of  Finance: the  withholding  tax  on
foreign  borrowing  and  the  tax  on interest  earned  by depositors.  Although  they
do  not  directly  influence  sectoral  credit  allocation,  they  affect  portfolio
decisions  by the  financial  system  and  the  private  sector  and  thus  credit
behavior  in  general.
The  tax  of 15 percent  on interest  income  is part  of the  overall
income  tax,  and  thus  serves  the  purpose  of  preventing  large  disparities  in tax
rates  between  different  types  of income. The  government  announced  in  August
1989  the  exemption  of the  tax  on depositor  accounts  of less  than  200,000  baht
as a  measure  to  promote  saving  of "small  savers". While  the  goal  is laudable,
the  means  is  not.  It  seems  likely  that  all  deposit  interest  income  earners
will  now  be able  to  evade  taxation  through  splitting  of  accounts,  a pot-ntial
loss  to the  treasury  of 7  billion  baht. 8 While  the  public  sector  is
currently  in surplus,  it is  not  desirable  to reduce  taxation  at a time  when
passive  public  sector  surpluses  serve  to restrain  aggregate  demand.
Attempting  to  enforce  the  measure  will  entail  needless  manpower  costs  for
banks  and  the  government  --  from  this  point  of  view  it  would  even  be
preferable  to  exempt  all  interest  income. Even  if the  measure  did  not lead  to
8.The  estimated  revenue  from  income  tax  on  deposit  income  in  FY 1988-89.- 15 -
tax  evasion,  the  creation  of  unequal  rates  for  different  types  of income  is  a
violation  of sound  and  efficient  tax  policy. 9
The 10  percent  withholding  tax  on foreign  borrowing  is  a  measure  to
reduce  the  disparity  between  the  tax  rates  on interest  income  received  by
foreigners  and  by nationals. Given  the  high  degree  of capital  mobility,
changes  in  the  tax  are  one  of the  few  means  available  for  the  authorities  to
affect  the  domestic  interest  rate. An exemption  was granted  for  foreign
borrowing  of greater  than  3  years  maturity  during  Hay-August  of this  year
(recently  extended). The  avowed  purpose  --  to  promote  long-term  finance  for
the  current  account  --  again  was  more  worthy  than  the  means  chosen. The
temporary  change  in  policy  led  to revenue  loss  with  probably  little  or  no
permanent  change  in  private  behavior,  since  the  private  sector  may  have
rescheduled  previously  planned  borrowings  to  fall  within  the  period  of
exemption. Private  capital  inflows  grew  spectacularly  during  1989,  but it
seems  likely  tley  would  have  done  as  well  in the  long  run  in the  absence  of  an
exemption. The  loss  in  revenue  again  was inadvisable  on stabilization
grounds,  since  the  overheating  of the  economy  called  for  the  only  effective
countercyclical  instrument  --  passive  fiscal  surpluses.  Also,  if the  private
sector  does  interpret  the  exemption  as  a more  lasting  measure,  it  will  worsen
the  overheating  of the  economy  by lowering  the  effective  domestic  interest
rate  and  increasing  investment  further.
9.Another  issue,  which  is  presently  not  very  significant  in  Thailand  because
of the  low  inflation,  is the  taxation  of  nominal  interest  income  when  only
real  interest  income  should  be taxed.- 16 -
F.  Financial  policy  and  macro  management
Aside  from  some  relatively  minor  departures  from  efficient  tax  and
credit  allocation  policy,  Thailand's  financial  policies  appear  sound  from  a
macroeconomic  perspective. The  extraordinary  progress  of  monetization  of the
economy  has contributed  to the  achievement  of  buoyant  private  investment  and
rapid  growth. The rapid  growth  in demand  for  financ.al  assets  also  helped
cushion  the  impact  of the  high  fiscal  and  external  deficits  of the  early  80's
as  well as facilitate  the  subsequent  successful  adjustment.  The  high  degree
of financial  openness  of the  economy  meant  that  fiscal  policy  was an  effective
tool  to  achieve  adjustment,  It  has  been  used  well  to reduce  the  previous  high
external  deficits.
The  only  potential  macroeconomic  problem  on the  horizon  is  one  that
many  developing  countries  would  wish to  have  --  the  problem  of  managing  an
economic  boom.  Policymakers  are  wisely  concerned  about  surging  private  demand
spilling  into  such  undesirable  channels  as  excessive  current  account  deficits,
inflation,  and  real  estate  speculation.  Moral  suasion  and  even  traditional
monetary  policy  instruments  seem  to  be of limited  effectiveness  due  to  the
high degree  of financial  openness. Fiscal  policy  continues  to  be the  most
effective  instrument  to  manage  the  boom  --  in this  case  by  passively  allowing
the  fiscal  surplus  to increase  with the  increase  in  revenues. So far,
policymakers  have  avoided  the  mistakes  of  many  other  developing  couantries
during  previous  booms  --  sharp  increases  in  public  expenditure  that lead  to
overindebtedness  and  then  an abrupt  end  to  the  boom.
II.  INTEREST  RATE  POLICY
The  purpose  of this  section  is  to review  Thai  interest  rate
experience  in  terms  of its  structural  characteristics.  Despite  the  existenceof interest  rate  ceilings  on bank  deposits  and  loans,  interest  rates  in
Thailand  have  been  volatile  and  responsive  to  demand  and  supply  conditions
over  the  past several  years. The  key  interest  rates  are  those  relating  to
bank  liquidity.  Movements  in  these  rates  are transmitted  to the  remainder  of
the  banking  system  and  even lead  to  changes  in  the  ceilings  of the  controlled
rates. The  ability  of the  Thai  authorities  to influence  the  marginal  cost  of
bank  liquidity  is  therefore  the  key  to  monetary  policy  in Thailand. Looking
to  the  future,  the  authorities  will  wish to refine  their  approach  to the
determination  of interest  rates  to  ensure  that  they  have the  maximum
flexibility  to respond  to  developments  in  increasingly  sophisticated  markets.
For  this  reason,  the  paper  focuses  on analyzing  the  role  of policy
interventions  on interest  rates,  both  with regard  to interest  rate  ceilings
and  indirect  influences  on  market-determined  interest  rates  as  well as fiscal
and  quasi-fiscal  interventions  which  increase  intermediation  margins.
Section  A starts  with a  brief  description  of the  pattern  of
intermediation  in  the  Thai  economy  in order  to  show  the  predominance  of the
banking  system  and  hence  the  importance  of focussing  on  bank  interest  rates;
it then  discusses  recent  trends  in  these  interest  rates. The  following
section  looks  at the  effect  of interest  rate  ceilings. Section  C examines  the
determinants  of short-run  or  money  market  interest  rates,  focussing  on the
respective  roles  of foreign  interest  rates  and  domestic  liquidity  conditions.
Section  D explores  the  instruments  of  monetarv  policy  which  may be  used  by the
authorities  to influence  liquidity  conditions  and  makes  some  suggestions  on
how this  toolkit  could  be expanded  and  refined. Section  E discusses  long-term
interest  rates,  and  the  role  of  policy  in influencing  the  yield  curve.
Intermediation  margins  or the  spread  between  borrowing  and  lending  rates,  is
also  subject  to policy  influence:  in  section  F the  magnitude  of the  various
fiscal  and  quasi-fiscal  impositions  on this  margin  are  reviewed.- 18 -
A.  The  main interest  rates  and  recent  trends
What interest  rates  are  important
Despite  the  recent  surge  in the  importance  of the  equity  markets  in
Thailand,  the  banking  system  still  dominates  intermediation.  Neither  quoted
equity  nor  marketable  debt  securities  approaches  the  value  of the  assets  of
the  banking  system. In  1985  the  capitalization  of  equities  traded  on the
securities  exchange  was  equivalent  to only  7  per  cent  of banking  system
credit. By the  end  of 1988  this  had  grown  to 20  per  cent,  a ratio  which
continued  to increase  during  1989. Marketable  government  debt  was  only  a
little  smaller  at end-1988,  but  the  bulk  of this  was  held  by the  banking
system. Marketable  private  debt  securities  came  to the  equivalent  of less
than  2 per  cent  of banking  system  credit. Thus  banking  system  interest  rates
are the  most important  prices  in the  domestic  financial  system.
?low  of funds  tables  have  been  prepared  for  Thailand  up to 1983  and
they  confirm  the  typical  pattern  of  household  saving  in  excess  of its
investments  in  non-financial  form. On average  over  1981-83  the  household
sector's  annual  net  accumulation  of financial  assets  was  over 7  per  cent  of
GNP (table  11).  In  contrast,  the  private  non-financial  business  sector
accumulated  about  the  same  net  amount  of financial  liabilities,  with further
net  deficits  coming  from  the  government  and  state  enterprise  sector. Summary
flow  statistics  are  shown  in  Table  11  whic:  reveals  the  predominance  of
currency  and  bank  deposits  on the  one  hand,  and  loans  on the  other. The  table
shows  that  most domestic  loans  borrowed  by the  private  sector  were
intermediated  through  the  banking  system,  and  this  remains  trcie  today. The
banking  system  is funded  in large  part  by deposits  from  the  public  (accounting- 19  -
for  about  84 per  cent  of liabilities  at end-June  1989),  with some  limited
recourse  to foreign  borrowing  (6  per  cent)  and  to borrowing  from  the  Bank  of
Thailand  (4  per  cent  inclusive  of the  special  soft  loans). About  10 per  cent
of the  banking  system's  assets  are  held in  the  form  of Government  bonds,  with
83 per  cent  in  private  credit. Some  4  per  cent  are  in foreign  assets  (cf.
Table  12).
This structure  of flows  defines  the  main  interest  rates  to be
analyzed. They  are  the  interest  rates  on  bank  deposits  and  loans,  on
government  bonds,  on the  interbank  market  and in  the  repurchase  market. These
interest  rates  are  determined,  at least  in  part,  through  market  forces.
Though  there  are some  subsidized  credit  programs,  these  account  for  only  a
small  fraction  of total  financial  claims  in  the  system.
Trends. Interest  rates  have  moved  quite  considerably  over  the  years
in response  to  market  pressures. Following  a period  of  high  nominal  and real
interest  rates  during  the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s,  monetary  stability  was
restored  during  the  first  half  of 1986  with  money  market  rates  falling  as low
as 5.5  per  cent. Since  late  1987  there  has  been  a general  upward  trend,  with
a surge  of rates  during  late  1988  and  early  89.  Table  13 shows  the  main
interest  rates  in  effect  in  Thailand  in recent  years,  and  some  of the  rates
are  also  plotted  in figures  6-8.  Figure  6 displays  the  movement  of baht  and
US$  money  market  rates  over  twelve  years. Though  there  is  evidence  of
correlation  in  this  figure,  it is  clear  that,  up to  1986,  baht  rates  have
normally  been  higher  than  US$ rates. Monthly  US$ returns  (annualized)  on baht
money  market  investments  are  shown  in figure  9.  The  stability  of the  exchange
rate  before  1984  is  evident,  as is the  importance  of exchange  rate
fluctuations  thereafter.  As shown  in figure  8, despite  the  depreciations  of
1981  and  1984,  baht investments  showed  a cumulative  gain  to  mid-1989  from  each
starting  date  1977-87.- 20 -
Looking  more  closely  at the  past  five  years,  the  two  interest  rate
peaks  in 1985  and  1986  are  clearly  evident  in  figure  7,  which  also  shows  how
closely  interbank  and  repurchase  market  rates  move  together, The  two  peaks
were  not  driven  by international  interest  rate  movements,  nor can  they  be
explained  by subsequent  exchange  rate  movements. They  correspord  to  a period
of tight  monetary  and  credit  policy.
Interest  rate  ceilinas
Both  lending  and  deposit  rates  of the  commercial  banks  and  the
finance  companies  have  been subject  to ceilings,  though  the  ceiling  on long-
term  bank  and  finance  company  deposit  rates  was removed  during  1989.
Considering  the  low  inflation  rate  in  Thailand  --  well  under  five  per  cent  per
annum  until  the  second  half  of 1989  --  the  interest  ceilings  have  always
permitted  positive  real  rates  throughout  the  1980s.
On the  lending  side,  the  ceiling  for  ba;;ks  was lowered  from  19 per
cent  to 17.5  per  cent  in early  1983  only  to be increased  again  for  non-
priority  sectors  to 19  per  cent  one  year  later  (the  lower  ceiling  of 17.5  per
cent  being  maintained  for  loans  to priority  sectors). In early  1986  the
ceiling  was lowered  again  in  two  steps  and  unified  at 15  per  cent  where  it
stands  today. A higher  rate  has  applied  tc finance  companies  (currently  18.5
per  cent).
Before  1986,  deposit  rate  ceilings  varied  by  term. Looking  at the
rates  for  deposits  between  12  months  and  two  years,  the  ceiling  on rates
remained  at  13 per  cent  until  early  1986  when it  was lowered,  in two  steps,  to
9.5  per  cent. As mentioned,  the  ceiling  has recently  been  removed  for
deposits  of over  one-year's  maturity. The  ceiling  on savings  deposit  rates  is
currently  7.5  per  cent.  Finance  company  promissory  notes  are  subject  to  an
interest  rate  ceiling  cu-rently  at 13.5  per  cent.- 21 -
The  degree  to  which  these  ceilings  have  actually  bitten  has  varied
over  the  years. As illustrated  in  figure  10,  deposit  rates  have tended  to
fluctuate  with  money  market  rates:  when the  repurchase  rate  has  exceeded  the
ceiling  deposit  rate,  for  example,  the  one-year  deposit  rate  has  been  at or
close  to  the  ceiling. Deposit  rates  show  less  volatility  than  money  market
rates:  when  money  market  rates  fell  to about  5 per  cent  in  1987,  the  one-year
time  deposit  rate  remained  at 7.25  per  cent. When  money  market  rates  once
more approached  the  ceiling  on deposit  rates  in late  1988,  the  ceiling  again
began  to  bite.  The  authorities'  response  was to remove  the  ceiling  on long-
term  deposit  rates:  this  resulted  in some  banks  increasing  their  deposit  rates
by between  one-half  and  onie  percentage  point  over  the  old  ceiling. Shorter
term  time  deposits  remain  subject  to  the  ceiling.
Despite  the  fact  that  prime  lending  rates  have  been  well  below
lending  rate  ceilings  (figure  11),  lending  rate  ceilings  do seem  to bite
continuously  to  a greater  or lesser  extent. This  is illustrated  by figure  t2
which  shows  the  distribution  by interest  rate  of bank  loans  in  1985-88. For
each  year  the  distribution  has  two  peaks:  one  at or about  the  prime  lending
rate,  the  other  at the  ceiling. (It  is  noteworthy  that  little  lending
occurred  above  the  separate  lending  ceiling  for  priority  sectors  in 1985).
Clearly,  there  would  not  have  been  such  a bunching  of loans  made  at 17.5  per
cent  in  1985  or 15  per  cent  in  the  other  years  had it  not  been for  the  fact
that  these  were  precisely  the  ceiling  rates. Without  ceilings  the  spread  over
prime  charged  to  many  borrowers  would  have  been  higher.
The  degree  to  which  the  ceiling  has  been  a binding  constraint  has
varied,  with the  proportion  of loans  being  made at the  ceiling  rates  varying
from  20  per  cent  to 47  per  cent. The  imposition  of a  much (between  2.5  and  4
percentage  points)  lower  ceiling  in  198C  resulted  in  a less  than  proportionate- 22 -
shift  in  the  interest  rate  charged  to  all  borrowers. Some  prime  and  super-
prime  borrowers  did  see  their  rate  fall  by three  percentage  points,  but the
proportion  of loans  at the  ceiling  jumped  sharply.
A further  striking  point  from  figure  12 is the  widening  of the  gap
between  the  rates  at  which  the  two  peaks  in  the  distribution  occur  after  1986.
This  is  reflected  in  a  widening  intermediation  margin  and  increased
profitability --  at least of the larger banks --  in those years.  It is likely
that  lending  rates  to  prime  borrowers  are  not  much influenced  by  the interest
rate  ceilings  because  of their  bargaining  power  and  alternative  borrowing
possibilities.  The  data  suggests  that  a lowering  of the  ceilings  will  have
its  impact  in  the  short-run  on  bank  profits. If so,  the  banks  may try  to
recover  some  of this  by charging  a  higher  spread  over  prime  to  some  middle
level  borrowers. Theoretical  considerations  suggest  that  the  higher  risk
borrower  could  also  be expected  to suffer  from  reduced  availability,  and  that
in  the  long-run  interest  rates  for  small  depositors  would  probably  fall.
B.  Determination  of short-term  interest  rates
The  key rates
Determination  of  bank  interest  rates  witnin  the  ceilings  is
influenced  by demand  and  supply  conditions  which  are  also  expressed  in  the
effective  interest  rate  for  wholesale  bank  liquidity.  Banks  adjust  their
liquidity  in  the interbank  market,  in the  repurchase  market  for  government
bonds  or tn.:ough  borrowing  from  foreign  correspondence  in  foreign  exchange,
which  may in  principle  be covered. The  BOT  intervenes  only  in  the  repurchase
market  and in  the  spot  foreign  exchange  market  (not  in  the  interbank  market  or
in  that  for  forward  foreign  exchange;  it  also  provides  lender  of last  resort
facilities  for  up to seven  days  through  its  loan  window).- 23 -
The  repurchase  market  in  government  bonds  and  the  interbank  market.
The  Bank  of Thailand  operates  the  repurchase  market  in  Thai  government  bonds
as  a means  of influencing  liquidity  in  the  banking  system. The  BOT  acts  as  a
market  maker 'n  that  all  bids  and  offers  are  made to  it each  morning. It  can
choose  to satisfy  the  short  end  of the  market  in  whole  or in  part,  or to leave
unsatisfied  bids  or  offers. The sale  and  repurchase  agreements  (equivalent  to
a form  of secured  borrowing)  arc  for  terms  of 1, 3, 15,  or 30  days,  with  most
activity  concentrated  at the  shorter  end. Any  unsatisfied  or  emergent
liquidity  needs  or surpluses  can  be addressed  by individuel  banks  in  the
interbank  market  in  the  afternoon. The  BOT  does  not intervene  in the
interbank  market.
The  Treasury  Bill  auction.  In  many  countries  the  Treabury  bill  is
the  key  money  market  instrument  and  its  yield  is  taken  as the  pivot  on  whi:h
other  rates  depend. For  several  years  the  quantity  of Thai  Treasury  bills  was
substantial.  Furthermore,  there  was  a regular  auction  of the  bills. However
the  improved  fiscal  situation  has  resulted  in the  supply  of Tressury  bills
effectively  drying  up.  There  were  no auctions  between  February  and  September
of 1989. Furthermore,  especially  in recent  years,  the  chief  bidders  for  bills
were  public  entities,  and  the  yield  determined  at auction  tended  to  be well
below  money  market  rates.
Foreign  borrowing  by  banks. Some  banks  make  quite  heavy  use  of
borrowing  from  correspondents  abroad. Such  borrowing  is limited  to a  ceiling
per  bank  of B5 billion  or 20  percent  of the  bank's  capital,  whichever  is  the
smaller. The  exchange  risk  of  borrowing  in  foreign  exchange  could  be covered
by individuai  banks  in the  forward  market,  which  has  become  quite  active  at
the  short  end,  though  contracts  beyond  six  months  maturity  would  be rare.
Though  it is  active  in the  spot  market,  where  it fixes  a  buying  and selling- 24  -
rate  each  morning,  the  BOT  does  not  intervene  in  the  forward  foreign  exchange
market.
Role  of foreign  interest  rates
The interest  rates  applicable  to  adjustments  in  bank  liquidity  are
thus  the  interbank  rate,  the  repurchase  market  rate  and  the  foreign  interest
rate  adjusted  for  the  cost  of forward  cover. Though  the  available  series  for
the  interbank  rate  is  not  considereu  fully  representative  of  market
conditions,  there  appears  to be  quite  a  close  correlation  between  these  rates
for  the  last  few  years. In particular,  interest  parity  has  normally  prevailed
during  this  period. However,  in the  mid-1980s  periods  of stress  were
associated  with  higher  domestic  interest  rates  than  were reflected  in  the
forward  discount. 10
The  interest  rates  for  bank  liquidity  have  not  been insensitive  to
domestic  monetary  conditions  as they  would  be if  capital  mobility  was perfect.
Indeed,  there  is  a close  correlation  between  the  repurchase  rate  in  Bangkok
10.1t  is  possible  to explain  temporary  deviatiuns  from  covered  interest  parity
in terms  of risk  management  by  market  participants.  Even  in the  presence
of a limit  on the  net  open  position  of  banks,  a bank  can  offset  a forward
foreign  exchange  sale  it  has  made  by  purchasing  spot  foreign  exchange  and
holding  it in  a low-risk  form  until  the  forward  contract  matures. The  cost
of this  operation  is the  interest  differential  between  baht  and  foreign
short-term  low-risk  investments  plus  transactions  costs. Likewise  a
purchase  of forward  foreign  exchange  by a bank  can  be offset  by selling
some  spot  foreign  exchange. Arbitrage  should  ensure  equality  of the
forward  premium  and  the  interest  differential  provided  the  banks  still  have
positive  spot  foreign  exchange  holdings. However,  if  the  bank  runs  out  of
spot  foreign  exchange,  as it  may at times  of balance  of payments  stress,  it
may  have  to borrow  abroad  to  offset  the  exchange  risk  on forward  purchases
of foreign  exchange:  the  bank's  credit  abroad  may  be limited,  thereby
resulting  in  a forward  premium  higher  than  the  interest  differential.  Even
in this  case,  foreign  banks  could  establish  the  arbitrage  by purchasing
baht  spot,  but  only  if  they  perceived  no risk  of  capital  controls  being
imposed  on them  if  they  could  fird  suitable  short-term  baht  instruments  to
hold  with  minimal  credit  risk.- 25 -
and  the  amount  of  banks'  net  borrowing  from  abroad  and  the  amount  of their
borrowing  from  the  BOT. This  suggests  that  capital  does  not  move smoothly
from  foreign  centers  to  meet  any local  requirements.  The  acquisition  of  baht
assets  by foreigners  or by liquidation  of foreign  holdings  by  banks  or  non-
banks  is only  induced  by higher  baht  interest  rates. Therefore  monetary
policy  can  influence  domestic  interest  rates  in  the  short  run  and,  through
these,  demand  conditions.
The  technical  note  appended  provides  some  econometric  evidence  in
support  of the  proposition  that  domestic  conditions  have  an influence  on Thai
interest  rates  in  the  short  run. This  area  deserves  further  study  in order  to
help the  authorities  plan  their  interventions  on short-term  interest  rates  and
monitor  their  effectiveness.
C.  Targets  and  instruments  of  monetary  policy
Money-market  interest  rates  as indicators
Although  the  monetary  policy  of the  authorities  is  generally
formulated  in  terms  of  monetary  and  credit  aggregates,  this  policy  is
implemented  by intervening  to influence  the  availability  and  cost  of  bank
liquidity.  The  attempt  to achieve  targets  for  the  aggregates  while  monitoring
interest  rates  poses  difficult  questions  of judgment  on an operational  basis.
In particular,  deviations  during  the  program  year,  from  the  originally
expected  path  of external  variables  can  result  in  higher  interest  rates  than
expected. The  authorities  recognize  this  by reviewing  their  targets  for  the
monetary  base  quarterly,  and  their  interest  rate  policy  monthly. It is
important  for  the  authorities  to  keep  their  short-term  operating  procedures
under  review  so  that  they  maintain  an accepted  framework  within  which  they  can- 26 -
respond  with  confidence  to  unexpected  developments  within  the  course  of the
credit  year. They  need  both  a prepared  methodology  for  analyzing  market
trends  --  so that  they  can  quickly  decide  whether  or not  to lear  against  the
wind  of higher  interest  rates  --  and  a flexible  mechanism  for  effecting
whatever  interventions  they  decide  upon.
For  example,  the  experience  of the  last  few  years  is that  the  BOT  has
not  fully  accommodated  within  the  year  shifts  in the  demand  for  bank
liquidity.  Towards  the  end  of 1988  especially,  though  the  BOT  was  providing
considerable  liquidity  support,  this  was  not  enough  to  prevent  interest  rates
from  rising  quite  sharply. Since  the  BOT  took  action  to  increase  bank
liquidity,  this  episode  could  be (and  has  been)  considered  one  of expansionary
monetary  policy. But  since  interest  rate  differentials  with abroad  were
allowed  to rise,  it could  be argued  that  the  episode  was one  of  monetary
tightness.  The  authorities  need  to  be able  to form  their  judgments  on such
situations  even  as they  unfold. The  increasing  exposure  of the  financial
markets  to fluctuations  in  external  flows  will  probably  increase  the
difficulty  of  making  these  assessments.
By paying  greater  attention  to interest  rates,  the  authorities  might
also  be in a position  to smooth  out  seasonal  fluctuations  in  monetary
conditions.  A fully  effective  interest  rate  policy  would  have succeeded  in
eliminating  any  systematic  seasonal  fluctuations  or predictable  transitory
movements  in interest  rates. However  there  is some  evidence  from  analysis  of
the  past  five  years  that  some  systematic  seasonable  patterns  may remain. It
is recommended  that  the  authorities  should  intensify  research  efforts  to
enable  them  to improve  their  forecasting  of the  factors  that  influence  bank
liquidity  conditions  so that  transitory  and  seasonal  influences  can  be- 27 -
eliminated,  and so  that  unplanned  conditions  of  monetary  ease  or tightness  can
be recognized for  what they are and dealt with accordingly.
Reserve requirements
Reserve requirements  are an element of the toolkit of monetary
policy.  However efficient monetary policy does not normally require a
permanent complex range of requirements  pitched at a h:gh level.  The
requirements in Thailand are briefly reviewed  here, together  with some
suggestions for streamlining them.
A number of reserve or liquidity requirements,  some of them
overlapping, apply to banks and finance companies.  The basic reserve
requirement is to hold an amount equivalent to seven per cer.t  of total
deposits in the form of deposits  with the BOT (at  least two per cent),
eligible (government)  securities (up to 2.5 per cent), and vault cash (up  to
2.5 per cent).  Of this seven, at least two must be in deposits with the BOT.
Finance companies are also subject to a seven  per cent requirement, though the
composition is different: 0.5 per cent in deposits at the BOT, 1 per cent in
deposits or call loans at commercial  banks and 5.  5 per cent of government
bonds.
To be eligible for the award of new branch licenses, banks must
satisfy a separate ratio,  namely 16 per cent of deposits to be invested in
eligible securities (including  government  and state enterprise bonds and bonds
of the Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand  --  IFCT).  Securities
counted  towards  the  basic  reserve  requirements  may  also  be  counted  here.  This
branching  requirement  has recently  been  weakened  to  allow  banks  to sell  up to
4  of the  16  on the  repurchase  market.- 28 -
In  addition,  according  to  the  local  lending  requirement,  each  bank
branch  established  outside  Bangkok  since  1975  must lend  at least  three-fifths
of its  deposit  resources  locally,  i.e.  in its  own  or adjacent  provinces.
Failure  to  make such  loans  gives  rise  to  a compulsory  interest-free  deposits
at the  BOT  in the  amount  of the  shortfall,  or alternatively  to the  holding  of
goverrment  bonds  in the  amount  of 4.5  times  the  shortfall. In  mid-1989  the
shortfall  (apart  from  waivers  granted)  was  B1.6  billiorn  or about  0.17  of total
bank  deposits,  of  which  B1.5  billion  was  placed  at the  BOT.
There  is  also  a BOT  guideline  that  banks  should  hold  at least  the
equivalent  of 20  per  rent  of deposits  in  liquid  assets. This  would
automatically  be satisfied  by the  combination  of the  basic  reserve  and  the
full  16 percent  branching  reserve.
Since  cash  reserves  perform  no useful  role  as a safety  net in  a
modern  banking  system,  these  requirements  --  apart  from  the local  lending
requirement,  which  is  comparatively  small  --  should  be seen  as  primarily  the
fulcrum  on  which  the  leverage  of  monetary  policy  is achieved  and  secondly  as a
form  of assured  and  fairly  inexpensive  finance  for  the  government.  This
fiscal  role  of the  requirements  is  taken  up below  in  the  context  of  policy
impact  on intermediation  costs. From  the  monetary  policy  point  of view  a
number  of comments  may  be  made  about  the  present  system. One ratio  should  be
sufficient  to control  the  evolution  of  domestic  credit. The  basic  reserve
requirement  is  the instrument  most  attuned  to such  a purpose. The  other
requirements  could  be phased  out  without  reducing  the  effectiveness  of
monetary  policy. So far  as the  design  of the  primary  requirement  is
concerned,  nothing  would  be lost  from  a  monetary  control  point  of  view  by
excluding  government  bonds  from  eligibility.  Indeed,  so long  as government
bonds  are  held in  an amount  far  greater  than  the  requirement,  that  portion  of- 29 -
the  basic  reserve  requirement  is  redundant.  By phasing  out  the  reserve
requirement,  the  authorities  would  also  be facilitating  the  development  of  a
transparent  and  active  secondary  market  in  government  bonds.
The  fact  that  finance  companies  are  permitted  to satisfy  almost  all
of their  reserve  requirement  through  holdings  of government  bonds  and  bank
deposits  could  prove  to  be a serious  loophole  in  a  period  of  monetary
restraint,  as banks  could  refer  depositors  to associated  finance  companies
where  the  required  reserves  were less  onerous  for  the  group  to  satisfy. Since
finance  company  promissory  notes  are  essentially  equivalent  to  time  deposits
at banks  the  requirements  should  be made  equivalent.
If the  branching  requirement  is  to  be phased  out  attention  must  be
given  to the  transitional  steps  needed  to avoid  any  inflationary  impact  of the
change. The  basic  principle  to  be adopted  here is  to increase  the  yield  on
government  bonds  to the  point  where  they  are  held  voluntarily. If  at that
stage  the  banks  are  still  the  main  holders,  then  the  removal  of the
requirement  will clearly  have  no immediate  impact  on the  volume  of bank
lending. Even if  the  process  of  bringing  the  rate  up to  market  leaves  a
greater  volume  in  the  hands  of the  non-bank  public  still,  as a first
approximation,  this  should  have  little  or  no effect  on internal  balance. The
tax  status  of interest  on the  government  bonds  in  the  hands  of the  banks,
together  with the  banks'  own  tax  situation  will clearly  influence  the  rate  at
which  the  bonds  wotuld  be  held  voluntarily  by the  banks. There  will  be no
substitute  for  a gradual  process  of feeling  the  water  in  order  to find  and
converge  on the  necessary  rate.
Mechanisms  of intervention
Considering  the  steadily  increasing  sophistication  of the  Thai
banking  system,  the  instruments  used  by  BOT  for  influencing  liquidity- 30 -
conditions  seem  somewhat  inflexible.  The  main  instrument  is intervention  in
the  repurchase  market. In 1987-88,  BOT  also  issued  its  own  bonds  to the  banks
in order  to  mop up liquidity.  The  banks  may  also  have  access  to the  loan
window  of BOT  for  last  resort  facilities,  but  this  use is limited  in duration
and  generally  at a  penal  rate.
The repurchase  market  is  conducted  as a daily  auction  where,  by
convention,  the  participants  generally  make  bids  or offers  only  at a single
interest  rate. By  netting  the  bids  and  offers,  BOT  arrives  at the  net
deficiency  or surplus  in tile  market,  which  it  can  choose  to satisfy  or leave
uncovered. The  BOT  has  no mechanism  for  taking  the  initiative  in  signalling
its  intentions  for  the  direction  of the  interest  rate  except  by failing  to
satisfy  the  net  demand. Thus  if  interest  rates  are,  in the  view  of BOT,  too
low,  then  it  will leave  an  unsatisfied  demand  for  liquidity  at the  end  of the
morning  repurchase  market  fixing,  leaving  it to  the  deficit  banks  to  make  up
their  deficit  in the  interbank  market  or eventually  at the  loan  window.
Considering  that  it  will  not  be easy  for  the  banking  system  as a  whole  to
generate  additional  liquidity  within  the  day,  the  likelihood  is  that
substantial  deficits  in  the  repurchase  market  will result  in  the  loan  window
being  used  that  day. In the  case  where  BOT  wishes  to see  interest  rates
lower,  it  will arrange  that  the  repurchase  market  is  left  with  unsatisfied
offers  of liquidity. (If  necessary  to  achieve  lower  rates  when  the  market
begins  with unsatisfied  demand,  the  BOT  could  supply  all  demands  expressed  by
deficit  banks  leaving  the  surplus  banks  unsatisfied.)  Once  again  this  will
push  the  banks  into  the  interbank  market. That  market  should  experience  a
falling  of rates,  but it  may  well be  that  banks  will  end  the  day  with excess
holdings  of cash.- 31 -
Under  the  existing  arrangements,  it seems  that  BOT  may  not  have  an
easy  way to take  the  initiative  in influencing  the  trend  of interest  rates,
especially  if it  wishes  to see  interest  rates  increase. For  example,  the
recent  strength  of inward  capital  movements  has  created  the  need for  more
vigorous  action  to sterilize  the  impact  on domestic  liquidity.  The issue  of
BOT  bonds  has  been  employed  for  this  purpose,  but this  has  been  seen  as an
exceptional  measure,  and  the  bonds  had  a two-year  maturity. The  BOT  should
consider  sale  of shorter-term  bills  or the  occanioonal  use  of aggressive
bidding  for deposits --  either on an  overnight basis or at term --  from the
banks  as supplementary  flexible  means  of allowing  it to influence  rates  in an
upward  direction  when that  is  needed. Any  such  deposit  taking  arrangement
should  not,  however,  become  an open  ended  and  permanent  repository  for  surplus
bank  funds. The  BOT  bills  would  have  the  added  advantage  of being  negotiable
in the  secondary  market  at a time  when the  diminished  supply  of government
paper  is probably  impeding  the  development  of the  money  market.
The  BOT  might  also  consider  the  advantages  of intervening  in the
forward  foreign  exchange  market. For  example,  at times  when  the  covered
interest  parity  condition  fails  to  hold,  BOT  could  step  in to  correct  the
market  imperfections  by buying  forward  foreign  exchange. On the  whole,
outright  sale  of forward  foreign  exchange  involves  more risk  than  benefits
especially  at times  of lack  of confidence  in local  currency. If the  currency
has in fact  depreciated  by the  time  the  forward  contract  matures,  the  effect
will be an undesired  expansion  in  bank liquidity.  A second  use  of forward
foreign  exchange  intervention  could  be in  the  form  of a swap  transaction
whereby  BOT  could  acquire  foreign  exchange  under  a swap  or repurchase
agreement  and  thereby  influence  domestic  liquidity  conditions  --  and  lower
interest  rates  --  without  requiring  the  banks  to  have  holdings  of government- 32  -
bonds  as at present. However,  the  adverse  experience  of other  central  banks
in supporting  the  forward  foreign  exchange  market  at  unrealistic  rates  is  a
reason  for  exercising  great  caution  in this  area.
D.  Regulatory  and  quasi-fiscal  impacts  on  the  cost  of intermediation
Certain  taxes,  reserve  requirements  and  lending  restrictions  have  the
effect  or increasing  the  spread  required  between  borrowing  and  lending  rates
for  banks  to  remain  viable. The  purpose  of this  section  is  to review  the  most
notable  of these  quasi-fiscal  impositions  and  to indicate  the  likely  magnitude
of their  impact. This  exercise  requires  a certain  amount  of discretion  to  be
exercised  in  choosing  what impositions  to  include. In  what follows  it  has
been  decided  to ignore  corporate  income  tax  and  withholding  taxes  on interest
income  paid  to depositorsll  on the  grounds  that  these  taxes  are  parallel  to
those  imposed  on other  sorts  of income. Capital  adequacy  requirements  are
also  neglected,  on the  grounds  that  they  serve  to  correct  a  distortion  which
would  exist  in  the  absence  of adequate  bank  capital.
in  Thailand  the  main remaining  quasi-fiscal  impositions  are (1)  the
business  tax  imposed  on all  receipts  of the  banks,  mostly  at the  rate  of 3.3
per  cent; 12 (2)  the  non-interest  bearing  component  of the  7  per  cent  reserve
ll.The  general  rule  for  domestic  investors  is  that  interest  income  and  capital
gains  are  subject  to  personal  or corporate  income  taxation. The  personal
income  tax  is  on a  progressive  scale  with rates  rising  from  5 to 55  per
cent;  corporate  tax  is  at 30  per  cent  for  listed  companies,  35  per  cent for
non-listed. However,  individuals  may opt  to can  acquit  themselves  of this
liability  through  the  withholding  tax,  which  is typically  at the  rate  of
152. Certain  exemptions  are  important,  among  which  may be  mentioned:  for
individuals,  savings  deposit  interest  and  all  interest  on  deposits  of less
than  B200,000,  and  government  bond  interest  (or  capital  gains)  up to the
savings  deposit  interest  rate.
12.Foreign  exchange  margins  are  taxed  at 15  per  cent.- 33 -
requirement;  (3)  the requirement  to  hold  government  bonds  in  order  to  be
eligible  for  the  grant  of  branching  licenses;  (4)  the  agricultural
agribusiness  and  rural  lending  requirements;  (5)  the  payment  to  the  Financial
Institutions  Development  Fund  --  FIDF (which  deals  with bank  rescues);  (6)  the
penalty  for  failing  to lend  sufficiently  within  the  region  in  which  deposits
have  been  raised. The  actual  costs  of these  impositions  in  cash  terms  can  be
worked  out,  but  it  depends  on the  assumptior.  made  as to the  alternative
behavior  of banks  if the  impositions  did  not  exist. As a first  approximation,
it is  customary  to assume  that  the  bank  will  have  to  charge  its  prime
borrowers  a spread  above  the  marginal  cost  of funds  which  is sufficient  to
cover  that  marginal  cost  of funds  in  addition  to satisfying  all  of the
requirements.  On that  assumption,  it  may  be calculated  that  the  average
spread  is increased  by about  1.5  per  cent  by all  of the  impositions.  This
figure  has  been fairly  steady  for  the  last  few  years. The  main contributors
te  the  cost  have  been  the  business  tax,  the  non-interest  bearing  component  of
the  reserve  requirement  and  the  branching  requirement.
It is  difficult  to be sure  about  where  the  incidence  of this  implicit
tax  falls. On the  one  hand  the  considerable  openness  of the  economy  means
that  large  depositors  and  large  prime  or super-prime  borrowers  may  be able  to
escape  higher  interest  rates  by their  option  to  place  funds  abroad  (despite
the  exchange  risk). On the  other  hand  the  interest  rate  ceiling  limits  the
degree  to  which  the  banks  can  pass  the  cost  in  higher  interest  to less  favored
borrowers. Probably  the  tax  has its  chief  impact  on  ancillary  charges  made by
banks  for  non-prime  borrowers  and  on  the  cost  of services  to small  depositors.
As the  burden  of this  implicit  tax  is  borne  by a fraction  of the  customers  of
the  bank,  it  bears  proportionately  more  heavily  on them  than  the  spread  of 1.5
percentage  points  would  suggest.- 34 -
The  conclusion  must  be that,  though,  the  quasi-fiscal  impositions  are
not  nearly  as high  as  observed  in  high  inflation  countries  such  as Philippines
1984-85,  Turkey,  or Zambia,  they  remain  significant.  For  instance,  1.5  per
cent  is about  one  half  of the  value  added  of the  banks. Consideration  should
be given  to  the  possibility  of reducing  these  taxes  in  the  general  context  of
fiscal  policy  improvements.  Of course  any  changes  here  would  have to  consider
the  alternative  sources  of revenue  or reductions  in  government  expenditures
that  would  be needed. These  might  not be inconsiderable  when it is  noted  that
these  measures  save  the  government  some  B15  billion  or so;  the  equivalent  of 5
per  cent  of government  revenue.
Nevertheless,  there  are  particular  problems  which  need to  be
addressed,  especially  the  impact  of the  business  tax  on interbank  lending
which  seriously  limits  the  potential  of the  interbank  market  to  perform  an
effective  channeling  of funds  to their  most  efficient  uses. The  VAT to  be
introduced  in  1990  will  replace  the  business  tax  except  for  the  financial
system. It  would  be a pity  not  to take  advantage  of this  change  at least  to
abolish  the  "cascading  effect  of business  tax  which  occurs  because  interbank
transactions  are  not free  of tax. Also  the  tax  could  be recast  to  give  relief
on interest  paid:  this  would  require  a higher  rate  of tax  on the  remainder  of
interest,  unless  some  loss  of revenue  is  to be  tolerated.
III. CONCLUDING  REMARKS
The  recent  Thai  boom  has  been  accomplished  in an  economy  with
considerable  opennesss  to  external  forces. Despite  the  fiscal  correction
achieved  during  1986-89,  the  domestic  demand  expansion  has  made itself  felt  in
a  widening  of the  current  account  deficit. While  this  deficit  partly  reflects
the  need for  a surge  of  capital  expenditure  to  avail  of export  prospects  and- 35 -
to provide  the  necessary  infrastructure,  care  will  have to  be taken  to  ensure
that  investment  does  not  get  too  far  out  of line  with the  long-run  savings
potential  of  the  economy.
The  ability  of the  Thai  financial  sector  to  provide  the  investible
funds  that  are  demanded  by the  boom  is influenced  by its  ability  to  mobilize
savings,  by official  policy  regarding  credit  allocation  and  by the  degree  to
which  capital  is  free  to flow  internationally.  Resource  mobilization  in
Thailand  is impressive:  its  liquidity  ratio  is  surpassed  by only  a handful  of
developing  countries.  While  there  is a  number  of selective  credit  measures,
mainly  favoring  agriculture,  agri-business  and  commodity  exports,  these  are
either  relatively  small  in  their  scope,  or  tend  to  be only  partially  enforced,
and  so  only  distort  the  allocation  of credit  slightly.  A number  of quasi-
fiscal  requirements  add  about  1.5  percentage  points  to  gross  banking  spreads.
Although  capital  movements  are  restricted,  and  although  there  is
evidence  that  domestic  monetary  conditions  do  have  a short-run  impact  on
wholesale  interest  rates,  nevertheless  wholesale  interest  rate  tend  to
converge  to foreign  levels  in  the  medium  term,  suggesting  that  the  impact  of
monetary  policy  is only  in  the  short-run.  The interest  rate  ceilings  on  bank
loans  have  probably  lowered  the  cost  for  some  non-prime  borrowers,  but  may
have increased  rates  for  others  and  excluded  some  high-risk  borrowers.
We have  made a  number  of recommendations  for  the  further  development
of  monctary  policy  instruments  and  for  the  recasting  and  reduction  of  quasi-
fiscal  and  credit  allocation  impositions  on the  financial  system.- 36  -
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Table  1:  GDP  by Industrial  Origin  and  Expenditure
(Millions  of baht)
Average
1970-79  1980-85  1986  1987  1988
-(----------(  of GDP  at  Current  Prices)  -----_>
Agriculture  25.7  19.8  16.5  16.1  16.9
Non-Agriculture  74.3  80.2  83.5  83.9  83.1
Mining  &  Quarrying  2.8  3.3  3.1  3.1  3.0
Manufacturing  4.6  5,3  5.2  5.1  5.1
Construction  19.0  21.8  23.3  23.9  24.4
Elect'y  & Water  Supply  1.2  1.7  2.6  2.6  2.6
Transpo.  E  Commuinicatior.  5.9  6.7  7.8  7.5  7.3
Trade  18.0  16.6  15.5  15.6  15.8
Financial  Services  2.2  2.6  2.6  3.1  3.2
Real  Estate  /1  0.4  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.9
All  others  20.3  21.5  22.5  22.1  20.8
<------ (S  change at Constant 1972 Prices) ---- >
Agriculture  4.2  4.9  0.2  -2.0  8.6
Non-Agriculture  7.9  5.8  5.6  10.8  11.5
Mining  &  Quarrying  6.3  4.6  -2.0  7.3  13._'
Manufacturing  10.9  4.'  9.6  13.6  12.4
Construction  5.1  4.3  -2.9  8.1  13.7
Elect'y  & Water  Supply  14.2  11.0  12.4  9.0  13.4
Transpo.  & Communication  6.6  7.0  7.2  8.3  10.8
Trade  6.3  4.8  4.5  11.5  13.2
Financial  Services  8.2  6.9  -0.7  33.6  16.3
Real  Estate  /1  11.0  8.6  11.4  6.6  26.8
All  others  7.3  7.1  4.3  7.7  7.7
TOTAL  GDP (constant  prices)  7.0  5.6  4.5  8.4  11.0
Aggregate  Demand  7.0  5.2  4.0  11.6  13.1
Consumption  6.8  4.8  4.0  6.4  8.8
Private  6.3  4.1  5.0  7.6  9.8
Government  9.5  7.7  0.2  1.1  4.2
Gross  Fixed  Investment  6.7  4.0  -4.2  13.2  17.7
Private  6.7  3.2  -0.2  26.2  23.4
Public  6.5  5.4  -11.5  -13.3  0.7
Domestic  D,mand  6.6  4.6  1.7  9.2  10.6
Exp  of Goods  & Services  9.7  8.2  14.6  21.6  22.6
Imp  of Goods  & Services  7.1  1.7  3.3  28.4  30.9
/1  Includes  insurar2e.
Source:  NESDB, 1989.- 7-
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Table  2s  Inflation  Rates  (1976  - 100)
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1939  *
CPI (all  iteme)  181.1  187.9  189.5  194.1  197.7  202.6  210.4
Food  176.6  185.5  183.4  178.9  180.8  184.1  193.5
Non.-food  181.8  186.7  191.2  202.2  207.5  213.0  219.7
PPI  (all  items)  174.5  169.1  169.0  168.4  178.4  193.0
<-----------------------  1 Change  -------------- _-->
CPI  3.8  0.9  2.4  1.9  2.5  3.8  4.9
Food  5.0  -1.1  -2.5  1.1  1.8  5.1  7.5
Non-food  2.7  2.4  5.8  2.6  2.7  3.1  3.2
PPI  -3.1  -0.1  -0.4  5.9  8.2  5.0
*  -January  - August  1989  average  increase  over  same  period  in  1988.
Source: Quarterly  Bulletin,  Bank  of  Thailand,  Vol.  29  no.  1,  March  1989.-38 -
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Table 3:  Gross Investment and Savings
(Millions  of baht)
Period Average
1970-79  1.980-85  1986  1987  1988
Investment /  GDP  25.8  25.1  22.0  25.8  27.5
Fixed Inv /  GDP  23.8  24.3  21.7  23.5  25.8
Priv Inv /  GDP  17.4  15.7  14.1  17.3  20.0
Public Inv / GDP  6.4  8.6  7.6  6.3  5.8
Inventories/  GDP  2.0  0.9  0.4  2.3  1.7
Savings /  GDP  22.6  19.7  22.7  24.9  24.5
Total Private /  GDP  19.0  19.1  18.4  19.1  19.4
Net Private /  GDP  12.2  12.0  9.8  10.7  11.4
Depreciation I  GDP  6.8  7.1  8.5  8.3  8.0
Public Savings/  GDP  2.8  1.3  1.8  3.8  7.2
Resource Bal /  GDP  -3.2  -5.4  0.6  -0.9  -3.0
Priv Resc Bal /GDP  -0.4  2.6  4.0  -0.4  -2.4
Pub Resc Bal /  GDP  -3.6  -7.3  -5.8  -2.5  1.5
Discrepancy /  GDP  0.8  -0.7  2.5  2.0  -2.1
Source:  NESDB, 1989.- 39  -
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TabLe  4:  Fiscal  Account  Summary
Consolidated  Non-financial  Public  Sector
(as  percentage  of calendar  year  GDP)
1981/82  1982/83  1983/84  1984/85  1985/86  1986/87  1987/88  1988/89  e
Revenue  &  Grants  16.67  17.87  19.17  19.28  19.42  20.15  22.01  22.75
Revenue  16.35  17.54  18.77  18.91  18.93  19.59  21.59  22.32
Central  Goverrment  14.17  14.99  15.24  15.83  15.15  15.83  17.70  19.08
Local  Government  0.91  0.91  0.97  0.98  0.98  0.97  0.93  0.91
Non-fin  public  enterprises  1.26  1.65  2.56  2.10  2.79  2.79  2.96  2.33
Grants  0.32  0.33  0.40  0.37  0.49  0.57  0.42  0.43
CentraL  Govermnent  0.32  0.33  0.40  0.37  0.49  0.57  0.42  0.43
Expend  & Lending  - Repayments  24.42  23.47  23.67  25.52  24.09  21.61  20.84  21.01
Current  Expenditure  16.00  16.00  16.63  17.51  16.82  15.69  14.63  14.62
Central  Goverrvnent  14.96  15.02  15.56  16.45  15.82  14.83  13.74  13.78
Local  Goverrwnent  1.03  0.98  1.08  1.05  0.99  0.86  0.89  0.85
Capital  Expenditure  8.32  7.49  7.05  7.89  7.18  5.93  6.26  6.35
Central  Goverrinent  4.02  3.51  3.10  3.78  3.39  2.82  2.32  2.41
Local  Government  0.62  0.62  0.56  0.59  0.57  0.46  0.50  0.48
Non-fin  public  enterprises  3.69  3.37  3.39  3.52  3.22  2.66  3.44  3.46
Lending  minus  Repayment  0.10  -0.02  -0.01  0.12  0.09  -0.01  -0.05  0.04
Central  Government  0.10  -0.02  -0.01  0.12  0.09  -0.01  *0.05  0.04
Deficit(-)/  SuirpLus(+)  -7.75  -5.60  -4.51  -6.23  -4.67  -1.47  1.16  1.73
Financing  7.88  5.64  4.47  6.32  4.63  1.45  -1.23  1.69
External  Borrowing  3.18  2.42  1.48  2.75  1.41  0.16  0.46  0.16
Receipt  4.03  3.26  3.69  5.39  4.11  2.30  2.77  1.36
Repayments  0.85  0.85  2.21  2.64  2.70  2.14  2.31  1.20
Domestic  Borrowing  4.71  3.22  2.99  3.57  3.22  1.29  -1.69  -1.85
Banks  3.58  1.38  2.10  0.81  1.10  0.26  -3.41  -1.77
Non-banks  1.12  1.84  0.89  2.76  2.12  1.04  1.72  -0.08
Government  Saving3  Bank  0.53  0.81  0.67  1.11  1.31  1.35  0.87  -0.07
Others  0.60  1.03  0.22  1.66  0.81  -0.31  0.85  -0.01
Discrepancy:  Deficit  - Financing  0.13  0.03  -0.04  0.0S  -0.04  -0.02  -0.06  0.04
Source: Bank  of Thailand,  1989.Figure  1
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Table  6:  External  Financing  Ratios
(Millions  of babt)
1978  1919  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
Ratios:(%)  ----------------------------------------  % of Investment  ----------------------------------------------- >
Total  External  Financing/Total  Inv  10.9  17.5  22.9  23.1  20.6  15.2  18.9  39.4  12.4  13.7  3.0
Total  Debt  Flows  /Tot  Investment  10.1  16.8  20.7  19.9  18.3  11.7  15.0  37.6  9.6  10.8  -4.0
DFI /  Totsl  Investment  0.8  0.7  2.2  3.2  2.3  3.6  4.0  1.8  2.9  2.8  7.0
Total  Private  /Priv  Invest  2.6  7.6  13.4  13.6  9.0  11.4  18.1  11.0  -1.7  0.0  10.8
Debt  /Priv  Inv-stment  1.1  6.4  9.8  8.3  6.6  6.7  11.9  8.0  -6.2  -4.2  1.2
DFI  /Priv  Investment  1.3  1.1  3.6  6.3  3.4  6.7  6.2  3.0  4.6  4.2  9.6
DFI loans/  Pr,v Invest  1.6  -0.7  0.7  -0.6  1.9
DFI  equity/  Priv  Invest  4.6  3.7  3.8  4.8  7.8
Total  Public  /Pub  Invest  34.S  44.9  43.6  43.9  41.7  26.3  21.6  87.0  39.1  66.1  -23.0
<-------------------------------------------  Nof  GOP ---- ______________________________________________)
Total  Debt  Stock/  GDP  11.3  14.6  17.7  20.6  23.3  24.1  26.2  34.2  33.8  32.8  26.6
Total  Priv  Debt  Stock/  GDP  3.9  4.5  5.4  6.0  6.4  6.7  8.2  9.0  7.6  6.9  6.2  s_
Total  Pub  Debt Stock/  COP  .. 4  9.9  12.3  14.6  16.9  17.4  16.0  26.2  26.3  26.9  21.3  'J
I .
/1 Includes  direct  foreign  investment.
Soure-: IFS  Yearbook,  1989; Bank  of  Thailand,  1989.'.44  -
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Table  6:  Financial  Aggregates,  Ratios  to  GDP.  Investment,  and  Savings
Period  Average
1970-79  1980-85  1986  1987  1988  1989  e
Base  Money/GDP  10.0  8.2  8.2  8.9  8.9  8.1
Ml/GDP  12.4  9.4  9.1  10.1  9.8  9.9
M2/GDP  34,2  46.7  58.3  61.7  63.3  65.4
Quasi-Money/GDP  21.8  37.2  49.2  51.6  53.5  55.5
Private  Credit/GDP  /1  26.1  40.9  47.7  52.0  57.3
Public  Credit/GDP /2  9.3  14.9  16.2  14.5  9.5
Total  Domestic  Credit/GDP  35.4  55.8  63.9  66.5  66.7
Net  Foreign  Assets/GDP  10.4  4.2  7.0  8.2  9.7
Ratios  to  Saving  or Investment:
Change  in  M2/Private  Saving  46.0  63.6  70.6  100.6  88.5
Change  Private  Credit/Private  Investment  29.0  40.3  16.5  60.1  62.6
Change  Public  Credit/Public  Investment  25.2  26.5  17.9  4.3  -56.5
/1  Includes  other  financial  institutions.
/2  Includes  public  enterprises  and the  government.
Source: IFS  Yearbook,  1989.  Bank  of  Thailand;  NESDB.- 45  -
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Table  7:  Real Interest  Rates  - Structure  and  Levol
(End  of period,  In Percent)
1960  191  1992  1963  1964  196  1966  1967  1966  1969
Doe.  Dec.  Doc.  Doe.  Dec.  DOc.  Doc.  Doc.  DOc.  Jun.
Deposit  Ratee:  /1
Nominal
Ceiling  12.00  13.00  13.00  1J.00  13.00  13.00  9.60  9.60  9.50  /2
Actual  11.00  7.26  7.25  9.60  10.00
ReeI
Coiling  -3.76  0.60  10.16  68.4  13.42  9.36  7.69  5.63  6.16  /2
Actual  7.43  6.47  3.46  6.16  5.46
Loan  Ratest
Nominal
Ceiling  16.00  19.00  19.00  17.C0  17.60  /3  17.60  /3  16.00  16.00  16.00  16.00
Actual  16.60  12.00  11.60  12.00  12.50
Real (actual)  11.76  10.14  7.56  69.6  7.87
Interbank  Rates:
No  inal  15.03  6.36  6.60  10.61  9.34
Rel  11.33  4.69  2.73  7.23  4.64
Gov't  Reourchoo Rate:
Nominal  7.69  13.11  .96  6.41  9.23  9.26
Re.l  .09  9.47  4.22  1.66  6.90  4.77
/1  12  months  - 2 yo r  deposit  rate.
/2  Coiling  was discontinued  June  1969.
/3  Loan  ceoiling  for priority  sectors.
Source: Quarterly  Bullotin,  Bank  of Thailand,  1969.- 47  -
Table  9:  Blill,  Loans,  and  Overdrafts  of Comurelal  Banks
as percentage  of  GOP  value  added,  classified  by sectoos
------- _-----.---.--------------------------.--------------------__----------__-----------------.--____------..
161  1962  1964  1904  1909  lo7  1983
an/  Va  lu  Added:
riculture  9.6  14.1  10.4  21.4  25.2  21.9  23.3  23.1
inin  A Manufacturing  31.C  33.2  41.8  43.4  47.6  44.3  49.7  56.8
ol Estate  A Construction  /I  20.6  21.9  26.9  26.7  27.0  25.1  26.6  28.2
reda  - s'aole,  retail  42.0  68.2  63.7  73.0  79.9  75.1  72.9  '0.7
blic  Utilitiee  10.5  7.9  8.4  *6C  9.4  6.3  10.1  9.5
nking  A Other  Financial  70.9  81.3  104.9  111.6  118.7  116.0  162.6  116.9
rvicee  13.1  14.0  16.8  186.  16.9  18.9  21.0  26.2
JAL  LOAN/  TOTAL  VAL ADDED  /2  32.1  35.4  42.7  46.7  49.4  47.6  63.4  56.4
Personal  loans  to  consumero  for  housing  is  included  under  real  estate  and  construction  and
excluded  froe  personal  consumption  loans. Voluw  added  includee  ownership  of  dwellings.
Loans  excludes  personal  consumption.
urce: lank  of  Thailand;  NESOO,  1069.Figure 5
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1971  1976  1981  1986
o  GDP growth  +  Construction, Real Estate, and Financial ServicesTable  9
AGRICULTURAL  CREDIT
Commercial  Banks
Percentages  of  Deposits
I  I  Agricultural  credit  I  Agri-Business  I  Total  I
Year  -----------  I---------I-  -------  I--------  I-----  -----  I-----  I-----  I-----------------
|  Dir  oct  I  Target IShortfallID.posits  IDC  +  BAACI  Crodit  I  Target lActual  - I  Total I  Target lActual  -
I  ICredit  (DC)l  I  I  at  BAAC  I-  Target  I  I  I  Target I  I  Target I
1975 I  3.19%1  5.00XI  1.81X1  2.4031  0.693X  I  I  I  6.S9Xl  6..OOXI  0.69X
1976 I  4.36X3  7.001X  2.66X5  3.605X  0.96Xl  I  I  I  7.9531  7.00%1  0.963X
1977 I  5.COXI  9.001X  3.50X3  4.22X1  0.72X3  I  I  I  9.7231  9.0051  0.72X3
1978  l  6.195X  9.00X1  2.81X1  4.21X3  1.41X1  5.605X  2.001X  3.60Xl  12.38X6  11.00X5  1.383X
1979  1  6.33Xl  11.00X1  4.67X3  4.02Xl  -0.6X31  6.63X3  2.0031  3.63X3  12.31X3  13.0051  -0.69X1
1960 I  6.62Xl  11.0051  4.38X1  4.0131  -0.37Xl  6.70Xl  2.00Xl  3.70X1  13.30111  13.0051  0.30X1  la
1961  l  6.7731  11.0031  4.23X3  3.6311  -0.60X3  4.62Xl  2.00X3  2.82X3  12.96X3  13.00X5  -0.04X1
1982 I  7.82X1  11.0031  3.18X3  3.27X1  0.091X  4.16X1  2.00Xl  2.1631  13.61X3  13.001X  0.61X3
I  1983  l  8.91%1  11.0031  2.0931  2.74X1  0.6531  4.1831  2.00%1  2.1801  13.88%1  13.0051  0.88Xl
1  1964 1  8.92Xl  11.00%1  2.0831  2.37X3  0.29Xl  4.53X1  2.00X1  2.63Xl  13.44111  13.001X  0.44X!
1956  I  7.71X3  11.0035  3.29Xl  2.1831  -1.1131  4.8331  2.00X1  2.83X1  11.8831  13.0051  -1.1231
1966 I  7.3131  11.0031  3.6931  2.0331  -1.67X3  4.97X1  2.00X1  2.97X3  11.31111  13.0051  -1.69X3
1  1967 I  9-00X3  14.00X3  6.00X3  1.99X1  -3.02X3  7.88X1  6.0051  1.8811  16.7891  20.00X3  -3.223l
I  1996 I  9.64X5  14.0035  4.16X3  1.90X3  -2.2611  7.86Xl  6.0OOX  1.8611  17.6731  20.00X1  -2.43Xl
Notas
1.  Excludes  rediscount  notec  to  the  Bank  of  Thailand
2.  Excludes  credit  for  agri-businesses  of  banks  exceeding  the  target
3.  Includes  small-scale  industries  in  regions
4.  Made  up  of  direct  credit  to  farmers  of  46,837.8  million  Baht  and
10,026.0  million  Baht  to  small  scale  regional  industries
5.  Same  as *4,  but  the  amounts  to  farmrs  and to  small  scale  industries
*r*  68,764.0  and  16,446.9  million  Baht,  respectively.- 50 -
Table 10,  Development credits by Bank of Thailand (million  baht)
--------------------.------------------------.---------------- __-------------__-------
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  19E3  1989
June
--------------------------------------------------- _----------_----__--------__-------
Export credits  15801  18602  19540  19142  19888  17966  35408  16402
industrial credits  1439  954  874  424  414  439  428  207
Agr'cultural credits  288  206  219  211  1354  1593  1055  1929
Other  8343  6912  11267  17016  26746  35383  35271  34582
TOTAL  25870  26674  31900  36793  48402  55381  72161  53119
Total credit by sector--commercial  banks  Proj
Export  28992  32022  39733  45020  50144  60809  72067  81515 \1
Hanufacturing  64893  88713  106049  122577  124945  162238  223931  253286 \1
Agriculture  22140  30541  37409  39355  39694  46137  57184  64681 \1
ther  190763  260686  298661  322553  334241  422598  513680  581019 \1
Total  306788  411963  481852  529504  549024  691781  866862  980500
Ratio of development credits to commercial bank credits by sector
Proj
--------- _-___-----__-- Percent --------------------------- >
Export  54.5  58.1  49.2  42.5  39.7  29.5  49.1  20.1 \1
Mianufacturing  2.2  1.1  0.8  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.1 \1
Agriculture  J.3  0.7  0.6  0.5  3.4  3.5  1.8  3.0 \1
other  4.4  2.7  3.8  5.3  8.0  8.4  6.9  6.0 \1
Total  8.4  6.5  6.6  6.9  8.8  8.0  8.3  5.4
---- _--_---------------------_-_--_--_-------------------------------__------__--------
\1  Figures for sectoral credit in June 1989 are projected by assuming the same shares or
total credit as in December 1988.- 51  -
Table  11
TUAXLANDi  FLOW Ol7  FUN  1961-53
Household  sualness  General Governsnt
31CNP  AI0NP  LI/GNP  37105  AIGNP  LIUGh  WlIQ  AIGM1  L/GN?
Currency and deposits  7.75  7.75  0.00  0.61  0.65  0.04  -0.20  0.45  0.65
Securities  0.79  1.37  0.5t  -2.64  0.13  2.97  -3.11  0.00  3.11
Equities and stocks  1.62  1.62  0.00  -1.39  0.16  1.75  0.35  0.35  0.00
Loans  -3.70  0.05  3.75  -6.62  5.87  12.68  -0.56  0.66  1.24
Insurance  And  pension funds  0.27  0.27  0.00  -0.02  0.00  0.02  0.02  0.00  -0.02
Other  0.60  0.57  -0.03  0.00  0.32  0.32  -0.01  0.16  0.19
Total  7.34  11.64  4.30  -10.65  7.13  17.79  -3.53  1.64  5.17
Note: The  table shows  acquisitions  of financial assets  (A) and Liabilities  (L) by household
business and  ovwernment  sectors as a percentage of GNP
The colums  (MP)  show net aequisition of finsncLal assets.Table  12
THAILAND: CCOINERCIAL  BANXS
I  198  05  1986  I  1987  a  1988  1989 in biLins  o  bat  D  Kar  Jne  ep  Dar..J19  Se.  ec  Kar. June n bilions  of baht  De.  |  Mar.  June  Sep.  Dec.  Mar.  June  Sep.  Dec.  I  Mar.  June  Sep.  Dec.
Total  701.9  715.2 727.5 743.7 767.6  804.6 628.8 853.1 920.2  960.7 1009.8 1055.2 1126.1  118-.. 1240.7 LiabilLties:
1. Deposits  549.0  567.0 585.8 596.1 618.9  647.4  672.5 69;.5 7il.3  767.0  802.5  823.9  882.5  924.9  987.4 2. Borrowing from BOT  26.0  27.0  25.7  29.9  33.4  37.1  38.2  3  3  40.7  47.0  47.4  52.2  56.7  45.3  38.2 3. Foreign liabiltti*s  45.6  39.5  36.8  36.0  31.9  34.7  31.1  .8.1  38.2  39.7  46.1  54.2  62.6  72.0  67.5 4.  Interbank  borrq:vings  4.8  3.1  1.7  2.2  3.2  2.0  2.1  1.2  1.8  1.6  1.2  4.7  7.3  11.4  12.3 5. Capital Accounts  42.4  42.7  42.2  43.2  44.1  46.3  48.2  52.8  57.5  58.7  66.0  67.7  68.3  73.9  77.1 6.  Other  iabilities  14.1  35.9  35.3  36.3  36.1  37.1  36.7  41.2  40.7  46.7  46.6  52.5  48.7  57.0  58.2 Assets:
7.  Private credit  527.9  529.6 527.3 531.8 552.8  577.9 598.9 624.8 681.8  716.9  760.7  805.6  864.3  915.6  980.5 B. Gov't Scurities  77.0  91.5  96.1 107.3 104.2  112.9 125.7 t19.7 114.9  125.9  125.3  125 0  123.2  127.9  123.6 of which RIP  net sat.  (-)  -2.8  0.7  2.1  3.6  -0.4  3.5  10.4  4.4  -0.6  -0.8  -1.4  -3.2  -3.5  -1.8  -4.9 9. Foreign assets  33.8  33.3  36.9  42.3  40.6  42.4  28.8  32.2  38.5  34.2  35.1  39.2  41.7  48.5  49.8 10. Cash  and DOT  21.2  19.8  20.5  18.0  22.1  22.5  22.9  24.4  25.7  26.6  26.8  23.3  32.3  32.3  28.8 11.  Other assets  after  |  42.0  4*.0  46.5  44.3  47.9  48.9  52.5  52.0  59.3  57.1  61.9  62.1  64.6  60.2  58.0 --  --  - - - - - --  - - - - - - --  --  - --  - - --  - - --  - --  - - - - - - - - - - - - - --  - - - - --  - - - - - - - - --  -_  _  - - - - ---  -__  - - - - - --  - - - --  - - - --  - - - --  --  - --  --  - -- _  - - -_  _ _ _,  --  - - - - - - - - -
Notes: 1. DepositA(excluding foreign and interbank)
3. As  in SOT fonr EC117
7. Private credit (excluding export bill and interbank)
8. Investment in Covernment securities, of which repurchase market net sale  ()
9. As  ln BOT form EC117
10.  Cash on  hand  and  balance  at  BOT
11.  After  adjustment- 53 -
Table  13
THAILAND: MAIN INTEREST  RATES,  1983-89
Central  Bank  Deposits  Bank  Loans  Govt.  Inflation
Bank  Repo  Interbank Ceiling Actual  Ceiling  Prime  Bonds  CPI
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
1983  Ql  11.5  9.0  11.2  13.0  11.5  18.0  16.0  11.3  2.3
1983  Q2  11.5  11.3  11.1  13.0  10.5  17.5  16.0  11.1  3.6
1983  Q3  11.5  12.5  12.0  13.0  11.5  17.5  15.5  11.1  4.8
1983  Q4  13.0  14.5  14.3  13.0  12.5  17.5  16.5  11.1  4.1
1984  Ql  13.0  14.5  15.7  13.0  13.0  18.0  17.0  12.1  3.1
1984  Q2  13.0  13.0  13.3  13.0  13.0  19.0  17.0  12.4  1.5
1984  Q3  13.0  13.5  13.0  13.0  13.0  19.0  17.0  12.6  -0.2
1984  Q4  12.0  7.7  12.3  13.0  12.5  19.0  16.5  12.6  -0.8
1985  Ql  12.0  15.1  15.2  13.0  12.5  19.0  16.5  12.5  1.4
1985  Q2  12.0  10.6  14.0  13.0  12.5  19.0  16.5  12.E  2.0
1985  Q3  11.0  10.4  10.9  13.0  11.0  19.0  15.5  12.2  2.9
1985  Q4  11.0  13.1  13.P  13.0  11.0  19.0  1.5.5  11.1  3.5
1986  Q1  10.0  8.4  11.0  9.5  9.3  15.0  14.0  10.7  2.3
1986  Q2  10.0  6.9  8.1  9.5  9.0  15.0  14.0  9.2  1.8
1986  Q3  8.0  6.2  7.1  9.5  7.3  15.0  12.0  8.5  1.6
1986  Q4  8.0  6.0  6.2  9.5  7.3  15.0  12.0  8.1  1.6
1987  Ql  8.0  5.3  6.0  9.5  7.3  15.0  11  5  7.6  1.8
1987  Q2  8.0  5.2  5.8  9.5  7.3  15.0  11.5  7.3  2.0
1987  Q3  8.0  5.0  5.6  9.5  7.3  15.0  11.5  7.5  2.8
1987  Q4  8.0  5.4  6.2  9.5  7.3  15.0  11.5  7.5  3.2
1988  Ql  8.0  6.7  7.2  9.5  7.3  15.0  11.5  7.5  4.0
1988  Q2  8.0  7.1  7.5  9.5  7.3  15.0  11.5  7.5  4.0
1988  Q3  8.0  8.9  9.0  9.5  8.0  15.0  11.5  7.5  3.7
1988  Q4  8.0  9.2  10.8  9.5  9.5  15.0  12.0  8.1  3.7
1989  Ql  8.0  9.2  10.1  9.5  9.5  15.0  12.0  8.9  5.5
Notes:
(1)  Bank  of Thailand  Basic  Loan  Rate:  First  tier
(2)  Repurchase  rate  (one  month  to  84:3,  3-day  since)
(3)  Money  Market  (period  average)
(4)  Ceiling  on Bank  Deposit  rates  (1-2  year)
(6)  Ceiling  on Bank  Lending  rates  (non-priority)
(7)  Prime  Lending  Rate,  most  banks
(8)  Coupon  on  Government  Bonds  (Period  Average)
(9)  Percentage  change  in  CPI  over  previous  four  quarters
Sources:  Bank  of Thailand,  IFS.- 54  -
Figure  6
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Figure  10
THAILAND: INTERST  RATES
14  S
12 -
1  1  n





S3  S4  15  se  S7  8
i.t





1.3  4  5  I  36Iae  1  7  18
a  C4iIng  CwDn-pe4w)  +  piimFigure  12
THAILAND  BANK LENDING  RATES  THAJLAND  BAK  LENDING RATES
us  mulmuiw.ul  f  llmTAJAN  BN  L  ENDIGa  RTE
Jo  - JD1  -X
ou  -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~u
__e-_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1  -_-
THAILAND  BANK LENDING  RATES  IALN  BNK  EDNGITS 
°1 
ja'T  iN 
* ~ ~ ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~as  as  *0100bt11  bl2l235Sh*3hs45 54SsSJsg  *g557  7357S335  la~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~f
THMLAND  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~Z  BAN  LEDN  RATESl  THAJIAD  BANKLEk4zstING  RATES7|Xl
m_  a_e_
nopq3q3  'o NA~~~~~~~~~~~u  a.euo  ames
so~~~~~PesfW-wevp
- ~~~~~V-f"M  bw- 58  -




Regression  Equation:  (Billions  of baht)
Y - current  account  deficit  (BOP)
X - public  sector  deficit
Y - .503  X - 1.585
…------------------------------------------.--.----
Std  Dev  of
Coefficient  Coefficient  T-Ratio
Intercept  -1.5849
X  0.5027  0.2472  2.0335
R SQUARED - 0.2161
ADJ R SQR - 0.1638
DURBIN  WATSON  STAT  - 1.5247
---------------------------------------------------
Regression  Equation:  (Billions  of Baht)
Y - change  in  net  foreign  assets  (BOT)
X - change  in  net  domestic  assets  (BOT)
Y - 5.93 - 1.04 X
---------------------------------------------------
Std  Dev  of
Coefficient  Coefficient  T-Ratio
Intercept  5.9344
X  -1.0399  0.0735  -14.1482
R SQUARED - 0.9217
ADJ R SQR =  0.9171
DURBIN  WATSON  STAT  - 1.2418
…----------------------------------------------.---- 60 -
Determination  of Short-term  Interest  Rates: A Technical  Note
This  note reviews  short-term  interest  rate  developments  in  Thailand
since  the  devaluation  of late  1984. The  main  variable  used is  the  IFS  money
market  interest  rate  monthly  1985.01-1989.4.  This  is  plotted  with its  US$
counterpart  in figure  Tl.  The  main  features  of this  figure  are  very  large  gap
which  persisted  between  baht  and  US$  interest  rates  throughout  1985;  the  fact
that  baht interest  rates  never  fell  very  far  below  $ rates  (the  widest  gap  was
about  150  basic  points);  the  surge  in  the  interest  differential  in  the  second
half of 1988,  when  baht rates  exceeded  11  percent;  and  the  subsequent  decline
to below  $ rates  in early  1989.
Theory  suggests  that  well-financed  and  risk-neutral  speculators  will
ensure  that  the  market-clearing  interest  rate  for  baht  securities  differs  from
the  US$  rate  only  by the  market's  expectation  of exchange  rate  change. A
further  assumption  of rational  expectations  would  imply  that  actual  exchange
rate  change  would  differ  from  the  expected  only  by a serially  uncorrelated
random  error  term. Plotting  actual  exchange  rate  change  against  the  raw
interest  differential  as in figure  T2 suggests  at the  very  least  that  the raw
interest  differential  has  been  a  very  poor  predictor  of subsequent  exchange
rate  change. This is  a common  finding  in  countries  with reasonably  stable
exchange  rates,  including  industrial  countries. Looking  more  closely  at the
data,  using  regression  analysis,  reveals  that  the  raw  interest  differential
has  been  a biased, as  well  as an inaccurate  predictor  of subsequent
inflation.
Thus,  in  a regression  of the  subsequent  month's  depreciation  (DELE)
on the  raw  interest  differential  (ID),  theory  would,  on the  assumption  given,
call  for  an insignificant  intercept  and  a coefficient  of plus  one  on the
interest  differential.  In fact  the  result  of this  regressions:- 61 *
DELE - -0.695 - 0.377 ID
(0.4)  (0.6)
RSQ  - 0.01  SER - 11.26  DW - 2.37  Monthly 85.01 - 89.04
Where  t-statistics  are  in  parentheses.  The  estimated  coefficient  on ID is
significantly  different  from  plus  one. This  bias  is  also  reflected  in  the
existence  of an average  interest  differential  in  favor  of  the  baht  despite  the
fact  that  the  baht  appreciated  by a total  of 7 per  cent  over  the  period. This
sort  of test  is subject  to  the  usual  caveats  that  exchange  rate  expectations
may  differ  very  widely  from  realizations,  thereby  weakening  the  precision  of
the  estimation  process,  and  also  that  the  timing  of the  interest  rate  and
exchange  rate  observations  may  not  correspond  exactly. Furthermore,  the  ex
post (uncovered)  interest  differential  ('RUNCT')  does  not  display  serial
correlation,  as illustrated  by the  estimated  first-order  autoregression: 13
RUNCT - -0.322 - 0.167 RUNCT (-1)
(0.2)  (1.2)
RSQ  - 0.03  SER - 10.83  DW - 1.96  Monthly 85.01-89.07  OLS
Nevertheless,  the  presumption  must  be that  exchange  rate  expectations  are  not
the  sole  determinants  of interest  rate  differentials  of the  baht.
If the  baht  interest  rates  are  not  simply  determined  by exchange  rate
expectations  relative  to  major  currencies  it is important  to  know  what the
determinants  are. One  simple  model  would  suggest  that  in the  long-run,  given
the  historical  stability  of the  baht/$  exchange  rate,  baht  interest  rates
13.Both  covered  and  uncovered  differentials  RCOVT  and  RUNCT  are  based  on the
three  day  repurchase  rate  and  take  account  of  the  withholding  tax.- 62 -
should  have a tendency  to  converge  to  US$ rates,  but that  in  the  short-run
domestic  liquidity  conditions  could  be important. This  is  a subject  that
deserves  examination.  A  reasonably  good  fit  was obtained  for  a  model  which
describes  such  a  process  by employing  the  stock  of  base  money  as an indicator
of  domestic  liquidity  conditions.
Specifically  note  that  the  supply  of base  money  is affected  by flows
which  are  not directly  controlled  by  portfolio  choice  decisions. For  instance
base  money  is expanded  by a current  account  surplus  of the  balance  of  payments
and  by the  government's  deficit. If portfolio  adjustments  take  time,  it  may
be that  a disequilibrium  may emerge  in  the  market  for  base  money  with supply
either  higher  or lower  than  the  willingness  of  wealth  managers  to  hold  base
money. An exception  would  be in the  short-term  borrowing  of the  banks  either
from  the  Bank  of Thailand  or from  correspondence  abroad:  these  can  be quickly
adjusted. If the  demand  to  hold  base  money (other  than  that  provided  by
short-term  bank  borrowing)  has  been  roughly  constant  during  the  50-month
sample  period,  it  would  be appropriate  to  use  base  money  (net  of these
borrowing  - 'NETBAS1")  as an indicator  of  excess  supply  of liquidity  in the
economy  with  the  expectation  that  it  would  tend  to  cause  a lowering  of
domestic  interest  rates. This  hypothesis  was  tested  by the  following
regression  which  models  an werror-correction'  or cointegration  process  of baht
and  $  interest  rates,  with  a short-term  influence  from  the  disequilibrium
liquidity  term  NETBAS1:
DELBAHT - 0.490  DEL$ - 0.391  ID (-2) - 0.717  NETBAS1 +  4.714
(1.0)  (5.1)  (4.5)  (4.5)
RSQ  - 0.43  SER  - 0.956  DW - 2.33  Monthly  85.01-85.04  OLS
DELBAHT - 0.323 DEL$ - 0.476 ID (-2) - 0.965 NETBAS1 +  6.284
(0.7)  (5.0)  (4.X)  (4.3)
RSQ  - 0.40  SER  - 0.980  DW - 2.36  Monthly  85.01-89.04 2SLS- 63 .
(DELBAHT  is  the  monthly  change  in  the  baht  money  market  rate  while  DELS is  the
corresponding  figure  for  the  $14  ).  The  equation  predicts  that  about  one-half
of  any  change  in the  $  interest  rate  will  be passed  through  immediately  to
baht rates,  and  that  gaps  between  the  two  rates  will tend  to  be closed  --  with
about  90  percent  of the  gap  closed  after  six  months  unless  there  is  some  new
shock. Short-term  shocks  may  come  from  fluctuations  in the  net  monetary  base.
An alternative  equation,  assuming  that  bank  borrowing  from  the  Bank  of
Thailand  are  not  as readily  adjusted,  uses  the  variable  NETBAS1,  equalling  the
base less  only  bank  net  foreign  borrowing:
DELBAHT - 1.039 DELS - 0.358 ID (-2)  - 0.400 NETBAS1 (-2)  +  4.307
(2.1)  (4.3)  (3.5)  (3.6)
RSQ - 0.35  SER  - 1.017  DW - 2.07  Monthly  85.01-89.04  OLS
With this  formulation  the  fit  deteriorates  a little,  but  the  $  rate  has  a  more
immediate  impact.
These  regression  results  are  clearly  preliminary  and  tentative. They
do suggest  that  domestic  liquidity  conditions  can  matter  for  interest  rates  in
the  short-run,  but further  work  would  be needed  to  confirm  this.
If short-run  liquidity  conditions  influence  the  baht  money  market
rate,  the  role  of  monetary  policy  interventions  by the  Bank  of Thailand
hecomes  important.  Over  the  past  thirty  months  the  Bank  appears  to have
adopted  a policy  of leaning  against  the  wind,  i.e.  of providing  liquidity  to
the  market  whenever  domestic  interest  rates  rose. Figure  T3 illustrates  the
14.Data  from  IFS,  monthly  averages. The  instruments  used  for  2SLS  are lagged
values  of the  explanatory  variables  together  with  DEL$.- 64 -
close  correlation  between  Bank  of Thailand  interventions  and  the  international
interest  differential.
Covered  interest  parity: Even if  short-term  baht  interest  rates  do
not fully  reflect  subsequent  exchange  rate  depreciation,  they  appear  to be
efficiently  determined  in  the  more limited  sense  that  the  international
interest  differential  usually  tracks  the  forward  premium:  thus  there  are  no
unexploited  risk-free  arbitrage  possibilities  in the  long  run.  Put  another
way, the  dollar  interest  rate  adjusted  for  the  cost  of forward  cover  is
approximately  equal  to the  baht  interest  rate  (figure  3).  (The  difference  is
0.25  on average,  which  is  weakly  significant).  The  autocorrelation  properties
of the  covered  interest  differential  were  also  examined. For  the  period
1985-1989,  the  correlation  (.7)  has  been  statistically  significant.  The
estimated  autoregression  regression  was (covered  interest  differential  is
'RCOVT'):
RCOVT  - 0.249 +  0.718 RCOVT (-1)
(1.7)  (8.7)
RSQ  =  0.59  SER - 0.837  DW =  1.97  Monthly 85.01-89.07  OLS
Deposit  interest  rates: Turning  to  deposit  interest  rates,  even
though  these  are  not frequently  adjusted,  they  do display  a tendency  to
converge  to international  rates.
DELDEP - 0.217 DEL$ - 0.226 ID (-1) - 0.222  ID1 (-1)  +  0.0012
(1.6)  (4.1)  (4.0)  (1.9)
R2  - 0.48  SER  - 0.0038  DW  - 2.21  Monthly  85:12-89:05  OLS
Here  DELDEP  is the  change  in  the  3-month  deposit  rate,  ID is  the  gap  between
the  deposit  rate  and  the  US$  libor  rate,  IDl  is the  gap  between  the  deposit
rate  and  the  3-day  repurchase  rate. All of these  observed  at end-month.- 65 -
The  equation  for  the  change  in  the  3-month  deposit  rate  indicates  a
modest  short-run  sensitivity  to changes  in  the  US$ rate. In the  longer  run,
the  equation  estimates  a tendency  to  converge  to  both  the  local  money  market
rates  (ID1)  and  the  US$  rate (ID). The  money  market  rate  is also  converging
to the  US$ rate,  so  that  overall  the  latter  is the  long-run  determinant  of the
deposit  rate.- 66  -
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Figure  T2
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